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ABSTRACT 
DO WE HAVE CREATIVE DIFFERENCES?  
HOW WE CONSTRUE CREATIVITY INFLUENCES THE SALIENCE OF 
NOVELTY AND USEFULNESS 
 (Under the direction of David A. Hofmann, Jeffrey R. Edwards, Alison R. Fragale, 
Adam M. Grant, Teresa M. Amabile) 
 
 
Creativity is one of the most popular buzz words being used in society and business 
today. Yet, how do people determine if something is creative or not? Business leaders 
often clamor for more creativity and creative solutions from their employees and 
investors shop for entrepreneurs with creative ideas, yet by what standards are they 
evaluating these ideas. As creativity is often defined as an idea that is both novel and 
useful, it is conceivable that people may be using a variety of combinations of these 
components in determining their own standards for creativity. Many scholars focus on 
creativity as a global construct, which confounds the independent contributions of 
novelty and usefulness. Drawing from the established theoretical conceptualizations of 
creativity as a product, I seek to understand how novelty and usefulness contribute to 
creativity judgments. Particularly, the main focus of this dissertation is what factors 
influence how people may prioritize novelty or usefulness in making judgments of 
creativity. In seeking to understand how the relationship of novelty and usefulness to 
creativity may be moderated, the contextual influences of psychological distance are used 
to begin to explore the dynamic nature of creativity judgments. Using both field and lab 
  iv 
experiments, I explore how framing a request for the evaluation of proposed ideas can 
change how novelty and usefulness combine to define creativity in practice. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Creativity is one of the most popular buzz words being used in society and 
business today. It has been highly touted as a cure for society‘s ills (Obama, 2011), a 
foundational requirement for innovation (Scott & Bruce, 1994; West, 2002), and even 
cited as a key competency in corporate leadership (IBM, 2010). If we are living in an 
economy driven by creativity (Florida, 2002); it could be important to know how it is that 
we evaluate ideas, products or people as creative. Researchers use judges to evaluate 
ideas, products, and people as creative, teachers attempt to stimulate and grade the 
creative thinking of their students, and businesses attempt to identify the next top creative 
talent, product, technology, or service. Yet, what goes into a consideration of whether 
something is creative or not?  
To identify something as creative, we must first define what creativity means. 
Over the last few decades creativity researchers have coalesced around one consistent 
definition of creativity (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Mumford, 2003). Researchers most 
often define creativity as an idea, product, or process this is judged to be both novel and 
useful (e.g., Amabile, 1996; George, 2007; Shalley & Zhou, 2008). If creativity is most 
often defined as a judgment that something possesses both novelty and usefulness, then 
how do considerations of these factors contribute to judgments of creativity? Creativity 
has been most often linked with novelty (Kampylis & Valtanen, 2010), so how is 
usefulness brought in to these evaluations? 
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Creativity is in essence, a subjective value judgment; it is best measured through 
social evaluation (e.g., Amabile, 1996; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). We rely on external 
evaluations in our empirical research (for a review see, George, 2007) and in practice 
(e.g., Elsbach & Kramer, 2003; Tierney & Farmer, 2004; Zhou & Oldham, 2001) to 
determine if something or someone is creative. While creativity describes the 
quintessential generative process, it is through the act of social evaluation that the results 
of these generative processes are deemed creative. Thus, the act of evaluation is central to 
any research on creativity and an important factor in understanding what we all are 
talking about when we refer to creativity in research and practice.  
The modern era of creativity research was given a jumpstart in an American 
Psychological Association Presidential Address in 1950 (e.g., Mumford, 2003; Sternberg, 
2006). In this address, Guilford put forward a view of creativity grounded in novelty but 
―under some degree of evaluative restraint‖ (1950: 453) to ensure the value or fitness of 
the creative product. This conceptualization of creativity put novelty in a prime position, 
limited by some consideration of the utility of the resulting idea or product. This view 
that creativity is primarily about novelty was reinforced in a follow-up paper on 
evaluating creative people that started with the sentence: ―One of the most important 
aspects of creative thinking is originality‖ (Guildford, 1953: 362). There is evidence that 
novelty may be the prime driver of creativity judgments (Amabile, 1996; Runco & 
Charles, 1993), so how does usefulness fit into our conceptualization? 
At some point the definition of creativity shifted from novelty bounded by some 
consideration of usefulness (Guilford, 1950) to researchers requiring both novelty and 
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usefulness in defining creativity (e.g., Feist, 1998; Zhou & Shalley, 2003) without 
discussion on how these factors contribute to that creativity judgment. This has the 
potential to cause a problem. When researchers define creativity as requiring both novelty 
and usefulness without specifying how this combination of both factors contributes to 
judgments of creativity, we lack clarity as to what it meant when something is evaluated 
to be creative (e.g., George, 2007; Unsworth, 2001). Yet even while researchers define 
creativity with the two dimensions of novelty and usefulness, most often they are 
measuring just overall creativity which blurs the contribution of novelty and usefulness. 
Thus the majority of our research does not inform us as to whether creativity is mostly 
about novelty or contributions of both novelty and usefulness. Defining creativity as 
requiring both dimensions and then measuring only overall creativity implies an 
assumption that both novelty and usefulness are contributing to the creativity evaluations 
as captured in much of our research. 
Creativity research is often conducted relying on some basic assumptions about 
what creativity means (e.g., Litchfield, 2008; Shalley et al., 2004; Unsworth, 2001). I will 
look to explore several critical assumptions implied in current conceptualizations of 
creativity as being composed of novelty and usefulness by seeking to answer three 
fundamental questions about the relationship between novelty, usefulness, and overall 
creativity. Do novelty and usefulness equally contribute to creativity? If the effects of 
novelty and usefulness differ, is this relationship stable? If the relationship is not stable, 
what explains those differences? If the relationship of novelty and usefulness to creativity 
differs then these two components cannot equally contribute to judgments of creativity 
and stability cannot be assumed. Thus, I will seek to test whether the relationship of 
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novelty and usefulness to creativity may be moderated by context factors as a way to 
challenge these assumptions and explore when usefulness may be a factor in creativity 
judgments. 
How we weight novelty and usefulness in making judgments of creativity may be 
critically important to whether specific ideas are accepted and promoted on to others. 
Creativity is often considered the first stage of the broader process of innovation (Scott & 
Bruce, 1994; West, 2002) and as organizations struggle to find a balance between novelty 
dominated exploration and utility focused exploitation (Smith & Tushman, 2005; 
Tushman & O‘Reilly, 1996) this focus on the end goal of innovation may necessitate an 
earlier effort at generating and filtering creative ideas based on those that might fit the 
type of organizational innovation strategy envisioned. If a manager and his/her director 
are both working to support employee innovation but each judge creativity focusing 
primarily on different facets of creativity, they may support and promote different types 
of ideas. The manager may filter out those ideas lower in his/her own focal facet but 
extremely high in the opposite. This would leave the director with, in his/her mind, only 
mediocre ideas at best. This type of selective filtering that is not aligned in how the facets 
of creativity are prioritized can really hamper an organization‘s flow of innovative ideas 
just depending on differential weighting of facets (novelty and usefulness) occurring 
throughout the organization in considering what is creative. 
Placing a priority on either novelty or usefulness may also be extremely valuable 
to entrepreneurs attempting to pitch their ideas to potential investors. An inventor who 
has come up with a slight new twist improving an existing product may want to engender 
a utility focus in others as they consider this invention. Another, who has developed a 
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potentially market making concept, may wish to help other investors to look more 
favorably and consider this idea as more creative by increasing their focus on novelty. If 
creativity is something we value in society and within our organizations, then how we 
deem something creative by balancing consideration of novelty and usefulness is 
important to understand. 
Novelty may be a primary driver of creativity but it is necessarily bounded by 
usefulness (Guilford, 1950). An idea that is original or new may be entirely inappropriate 
and thus not considered creative. As in the following example, a classic divergent 
thinking task is asking participants to ―name all things square‖, a response of baseball 
(round, not square) would be very rarely reported and thus novel but would not be 
considered creative because it is inappropriate (Runco & Charles, 1993). ―Outlandish, 
wild ideas can be creative but they are not necessarily so...‖ (George, 2007: 442), as they 
must to some extent be seen to create value to be creative. This type of limitation on the 
relationship between novelty and creativity implies that they should not be equated as 
synonymous constructs but rather closely related but bound by a limiting factor of utility. 
Yet how much does usefulness play into these judgments of creativity, if it is somehow 
required? 
Considerations of both novelty and usefulness are thus required for an idea to be 
considered creative, but the contributions of these factors may not be equal. Previous 
research into how novelty and usefulness combine to render judgments of creativity has 
returned conflicting results, with Runco and Charles (1993) finding novelty to dominate 
this judgment, while Rietzschel, Nijstad, and Stroebe (2010) found usefulness and 
originality to both contribute to creativity decisions. While novelty is a consistent factor 
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associated with creativity, contextual factors may play a role in how strong that 
relationship is as well as the strength of any contribution for considerations of usefulness.  
I would like to propose that evaluations of creativity are complex judgments and 
as such, decision making theory and research can inform us as to how in some instances 
creativity can be almost solely focused on novelty and in other cases novelty and 
usefulness both drive the judgments of creativity. In an effort to simplify decisions or 
judgments, people often limit the criteria considered (e.g., Simon, 1957; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). Heuristic processing often encourages a focus on the most prominent 
factor, increasing the salience of this factor in reaching a decision (e.g., Fiedler, 2007; 
Tversky, Sattah, & Solvic, 1988). With novelty being generally considered the most 
prominent facet of creativity, perhaps under many circumstances, individuals may simply 
conflate novelty and creativity, minimizing the role of usefulness in these judgments. 
Perhaps contextual factors can help focus our attention towards consideration of novelty 
or usefulness and increase the salience of these factors in making judgments of creativity. 
A situation that directs one‘s attention to the primary factor of novelty may discount 
usefulness and in a situation where utility is primed then perhaps usefulness will 
contribute to judgments of creativity along side of novelty. 
In this dissertation, I hope to explore how contextual framing may contribute to 
the salience of novelty and usefulness in making judgments of creativity. By testing if 
contextual framing can moderate the weighting of the factors in making creativity 
judgments, I am seeking to test the implied assumptions of a conceptual definition of 
creativity that requires novelty and usefulness, but does not specify their relationship and 
  7 
the measurement of creativity, ignoring the contributions of these factors. As utility is 
most often relevant to those who are closer to a task or problem, the contextual nature of 
psychological distance is used as the construct I propose that may moderate the 
relationships of novelty and usefulness with overall creativity judgments. Psychological 
distance has been conceptualized as the distance one feels from a situation or task as 
presented in a broader context of Construal Level Theory (Liberman & Trope, 1998; 
Liberman, Trope, & Wakslak, 2007; Trope & Liberman, 2010). To date, Construal Level 
Theory has been primarily explored in a laboratory setting. I plan on utilizing a 
psychological distance manipulation in the field to test my hypothesis and perhaps 
contribute to the collective generalizability of this theoretical perspective. 
 In attempting to return to theoretical conceptualization of creativity as novelty 
bounded by usefulness and operationally capturing both dimensions, as well as overall 
creativity, I hope to capture implicit variation in how novelty and usefulness contribute to 
judgments of creativity. In doing so, I am attempting to align the theoretical, operational, 
and implicit definitions of creativity for researchers and practitioners alike. This research 
begins to answer calls for clarifying what is meant by the ‗elusive construct‘ of creativity 
(e.g., Amabile, 1996; George, 2007; Paletz & Peng, 2008). Additionally, separating the 
global construct and its two components operationally, may offer a new measurement 
model for future creativity research and clarify how novelty and usefulness contribute to 
overall creativity (Zhou & Shalley, 2003). If creativity judgments are found to weigh 
novelty and usefulness differently across individuals and situations, the recognition of 
this may allow for more fine-grained research into this construct and more generalizable 
interventions for those in managerial practice (Kilgour & Koslow, 2009; Litchfield, 
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2008). As ideas, processes, and products are not deemed creative in a vacuum but must 
be relevant within a particular context (e.g., Amabile, 1996; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996), the 
contextual framing and an individual‘s perceptions of that context may be particularly 
relevant to how creativity is considered during research activities, as well as within work 
organizations.  
While fields or domains have been considered the fundamental context through 
which creativity is grounded theoretically, I am seeking to explore how the weighting of 
novelty and usefulness may vary even within a particular domain or field. If actors in 
different domains weigh novelty and usefulness differently, say between art and business, 
this may not be surprising and these results could still fit conceptualization of creativity 
as stable within a specific domain (Amabile, 1996; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). However, if 
within a single problem domain or organization, novelty and usefulness are weighted 
differently in making judgments of creativity then this may hamper organizational 
innovation and the traditionally assumed within domain/field contextual stability of 
creativity may be in question. 
While this consideration of the weighting of novelty and usefulness is being 
examined in this dissertation from an external evaluation perspective, I believe that the 
salience of novelty and usefulness is an important consideration to how we not only 
evaluate ideas of others but also how we internally filter our own ideas before submitting 
them for external evaluation. I would, in the future, hope to broaden this research 
program to include the attentional focus on usefulness and novelty during earlier stages 
of the creative process.  
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Approaching how the dimensions of novelty and usefulness combine to define the 
construct of creativity needs to be addressed at three levels: theoretically/ conceptually, 
operationally/ measurement, and implicit/ lay usage. In the next section, I will review 
several traditional theoretical perspectives on creativity to establish a common foundation 
from which suggest a return to more flexible considerations of how novelty and 
usefulness combine to reach judgments of creativity in our theoretical conceptualizations 
and operational models. I then explore how creativity has been operationally measured 
historically by researchers and offer a new approach to considering both facet and global 
measures. Using this foundation, I attempt to align the theoretical and operational 
approaches with how creativity is defined in practice by considering how novelty and 
usefulness are weighted in contributing to creativity judgments. To explore how novelty 
and usefulness may be differentially prioritized within the same domain but under 
differing work conditions, I test how contextual framing of psychological distance from a 
situation may influence the weight with which novelty and usefulness contribute to 
judgments of creativity.  
  
 
 
II.  THEORETICAL CREATIVITY 
 
As a socially bound construct, evaluation is a key component in process models of 
creativity (Amabile, 1996; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Campbell, 1960; Hogarth, 1980; 
Staw, 1990; Wallas, 1926). Focusing on how ideas
1
 are evaluated as creative instead of 
how they are generated is a departure from the current norm of creativity research 
(Girotra, Terwiesch, & Ulrich, 2010), as most of the creativity research to date has been 
focused on creativity production or generation using measures of overall creativity 
(George, 2007; Shalley & Zhou, 2008; Shalley et al., 2004). Idea generation is but one 
phase in the creative process with other phases of problem identification and idea 
evaluation little researched (Shalley et al., 2004). Evaluation is critical for idea generation 
and creative productivity from both an internal and external perspective (Mainemelis, 
2010; Runco & Smith, 1992). By first looking at how evaluation is incorporated into 
theoretical models of the creative process, I seek to highlight the internal individual 
cognitive requirement for evaluation in creative activities. I will then turn to how creative 
ideas or products have been evaluated as an outcome, to consider how creativity is 
                                                 
Creativity outputs are considered to be both tangible and intangible products. This product 
designation includes both actual physical products as well as intangible outputs, such as processes and 
ideas. I believe that creative ideas are foundational to creative products or processes. Throughout this 
paper, I refer to the output of the creative process as ―creative ideas‖ with the understanding these ideas 
may represent a range of creative products.      
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externally validated. While I review how both internal and external evaluations are 
central to creativity and are expressions of how creativity is defined, the studies 
conducted in this paper focus on external evaluation. I will seek to identify when 
everyday implicit definitions of creativity used in evaluating the ideas of others may 
confound creativity theory and research that assumes a stable relationship between the 
dimensions of novelty and usefulness with respect to overall creativity. 
Process Models of Creativity 
Creativity has been conceived of as a process, as well as a characteristic of people, 
products or ideas (e.g., Runco, 2004). Several theoretical models of the creative process 
have been put forward over the years describing multiple phases in the development of 
creative ideas or products. As I outline several of the most influential process models, I 
will direct most of my efforts toward describing the evaluative (internal and external) 
components and highlighting how the criteria of novelty and usefulness are included in 
each process model. Often these process models are grounded using explicit conceptual 
definitions of creativity and in those cases these definitions will be reviewed. 
One of the most influential process models of creativity was put forward by Wallas in 
his book The Art of Thought in 1926. While presenting a treatise on conscious and 
unconscious thought, Wallas developed a four stage process model of creativity. Wallas 
(1926: 79) outlines the successive phases of Preparation, Incubation, Illumination, and 
Verification as stages in developing ―a new generalization or invention, or the poetical 
expression of a new idea‖. The Preparation stage is conceived of as a time for conscious 
consideration of the problem at hand through an examination and analysis of the various 
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aspects of the problem and a gathering of available knowledge and resources. The next 
stage, Incubation, is described as an unconscious mental exploration of the problem and 
potential solutions. It is within this stage that novelty is introduced to the process through 
building a large variety of connections. When this Incubation process generates a 
potential solution, this idea is raised to the conscious awareness in a nearly instantaneous 
flash described by Wallas as the stage of Illumination. Once an idea has been raised to 
the conscious level, the individual moves to the Verification stage where ―both the 
validity of the idea was tested, and the idea itself was reduced to exact form‖ (Wallas, 
1926: 81). The Verification stage is described as needing discipline, attention, and 
conscious consideration of the original problem. It is within this Verification stage that an 
individual evaluates whether the idea generated through the first three processes is useful 
by considering if the idea meets the expectations of the prescribed problem.   
Another influential process model of creativity was presented by Hogarth as part of a 
larger volume on the psychology of decisions entitled Judgment and Choice in 1980. In 
putting together this process model, Hogarth (1980: 111) defines creativity as ―when 
ideas, ‗things‘ or associations are produced in some new combination that is either useful 
or appropriate for a particular problem or purpose‖. The following process model is based 
on the idea that ―originality and appropriateness are probably the most important aspects 
of creativity‖ (Hogarth, 1980: 112). Hogarth‘s model includes stages of Preparation, 
Production, Evaluation, and Implementation. The Preparation stage focuses on defining 
the problem analytically, which includes considering all of the information at hand and an 
exploration of any current assumptions implicit in the problem. Idea generation takes 
place in the Production stage, where an unconstrained mind builds a vast number of 
  13 
potential solutions through making diverse associations. The consideration of an idea‘s 
novelty is encouraged as a means to fight satisficing in accepting the first solution 
generated (most likely a common one). Once a number of ideas are generated, a 
systematic examination of whether these potential solutions fit the problem previously 
identified is conducted. This Evaluation stage is a conscious judgment about the 
appropriateness of the conceived new ideas. The primary criterion to determine the 
appropriateness of these ideas is how well the proposed solution fits the initial problem. 
Hogarth‘s model adds a fourth step of Implementation to the process, extending this 
model of the creativity process beyond an individual‘s mind to a point where the idea is 
shared with others in an attempt to gain social support for the creative idea. This 
Implementation step implies that relevant others perform an external evaluation of the 
resulting creativity product in determining whether to support the product. 
Amabile‘s texts The Social Psychology of Creativity (1983) and the updated version 
Creativity in Context (1996) provide a clear statement of how creativity is conceptually 
defined, as well as a process model of creativity.  Her conceptual definition is stated as: 
―A product or response will be judged as creative to the extent that (a) it is both a novel 
and appropriate, useful, correct or valuable response to the task at hand, and (b) the task 
is heuristic rather than algorithmic‖ (Amabile, 1996: 35). This definition identifies that 
creativity judgments require both components of novelty and usefulness. Amabile (1996) 
contends that there is a continuum of creativity from low levels of incremental 
improvement to common items to transformative ideas that may form new fields or even 
societies. Judgment is central to this definition of creativity as assessments of creativity 
―must, ultimately, be socially, culturally, and historically bound‖ (Amabile, 1996: 38). 
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Evaluations of novelty and usefulness must be made within some context or field which 
provides a comparison set for judgment. Consideration of novelty is restrained not by an 
expression of absolute uniqueness (singularity), but rather the relative newness or rarity 
of its occurrence within a particular domain and time. Usefulness is bound to the task at 
hand and the meaning of the particular context.  Combined these two factors are 
described as the criteria for creativity assessments. 
The second part of the definition referring to the nature of the task itself specifies that 
the solution to the task ―is not completely straight forward‖ (Amabile, 1996: 35) from the 
perspective of the person generating the solution. Thus, a student making an advanced 
connection, previously put forward by another unbeknownst to the student, would be said 
to be acting creatively even if a society of experts hold this connection as accepted 
knowledge. This view holds that ―...if the task is heuristic for the individual in question, 
then novel and appropriate solutions generated by the individual can be considered 
creative‖ (Amabile, 1996: 36). This second part of Amabile‘s definition has often been 
left out in descriptions of creativity citing this work (e.g., George, 2007; Grant & Berry, 
2011; Shalley et al., 2004). However, this part is often presumed in that if the task already 
had a correct solution available, there would be no need for a creative one to be 
generated. 
The process model put forward by Amabile (1996) as part of her Componential 
Model of Creativity contains five steps. These steps are connected and while they are 
most likely to progress in order, it may be necessary to return or jump back any number 
of steps to revise the products of that step as the process continues. Step one is Problem 
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or Task Identification where a problem is either identified internally or externally as 
requiring the development of a creative solution. Once the problem is defined, 
information is gathered in the Preparation step. This information is used in the third step, 
Response Generation, to help develop response possibilities. This model holds that the 
more possibilities generated, the more likely that a novel and appropriate solution will be 
developed.  The appropriateness of responses is considered in the fourth step, Response 
Validation and Communication, where potential ideas are evaluated against the 
assessment criteria of the initial problem. This step also includes communication, because 
creativity cannot be judged unless the problem solver communicates the resultant idea or 
produces a product to be judged. Finally, the Outcome step is a decision point where the 
results of step four are considered and the process is terminated (as a success or a failure) 
or a determination is made that progress has been made and further iterations of earlier 
steps are in order. Thus this model is designed not just to be linear but potentially 
iterative. 
In 1990, Staw fleshed out an evolutionary approach to creativity by combining the  
description put forward by Campbell (1960) of how people develop and retain new 
knowledge with the process model proposed by Amabile (1983).  In building this process 
model Staw ―defines creativity as a product of variation and selective retention 
processes‖ (1990: 289). As such, this process model is broken down into two processes: 
Variation and Selective Retention. Variation from what is known or expected arises when 
a problem is discovered or presented to an individual. The identification of a problem 
itself may point to new options as ―variety can be introduced in the very definition of the 
problem itself‖ (Staw, 1990: 293). The generation of alternative solutions is the part of 
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the Variation process in which a programmatic search for options is combined with a 
process of ‗blind variation‘ or unconscious exploration of randomly connected options to 
build a number of possible solutions. The usefulness of possible solutions are considered 
during the Selection Retention process, where from a pool of generated ideas one or more 
are identified as preferred alternatives by considering the possible solutions against an 
internal criteria based on their potential ―to solve the problem or personal affinity‖ (Staw, 
1990: 293). The selected ideas are then tested either practically or socially. If an idea 
works or is accepted, it is retained. However, if all ideas are rejected, either the creative 
process is abandoned or must begin anew.  
The final process model I will consider here is one put forward by 
Csikszentmihalyi (1996) in his book Creativity: Flow and the Psychology of Discovery 
and Invention. Csikszentmihalyi (1996: 25) begins his discussion of creativity by 
defining it as ―to bring into existence something genuinely new that is valued enough to 
be added to the culture‖. Creativity is further defined as occurring ―when a person...has a 
new idea or sees a new pattern, and when this novelty is selected by the appropriate field 
for inclusion into the relevant domain‖ (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996: 28). The person 
generating the idea, the domain or context the idea or product changes, and the members 
of the field which are the gatekeepers of what is accepted into the domain are the three 
main components of the System Theory of Creativity. An example of this model in 
organizational behavior research might be, an author (Person) conducting and writing up 
an experiment examining a new relationship between constructs, choosing an audience to 
address the findings to by way of submitting the article to a specific journal (Domain), 
the reviewers and editors (gatekeepers of the Field) then determine if the article has value 
  17 
within that particular domain. If so determined, the article is accepted. This acceptance 
confers that the author‘s product is Creative. 
From this Systems Theory, Csikszentmihalyi (1996) outlines a process model of 
creativity with five phases. While he holds that the process model as stated is relatively 
valid and simple, the linear nature as described must not be taken too literally. How in 
practice the creative process unfolds in reality is more complex, the phases occur in a 
more recursive and overlapping process, often with multiple iterations of these phases 
occurring before a creative idea is born. Becoming immersed in a problem either 
consciously or unconsciously occurs during Preparation. When a common solution is not 
readily apparent, creative solutions are sought. The Incubation period occurs when ―ideas 
churn below the threshold of consciousness‖ (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996: 79) and unusual 
connections are stimulated. As common, readily available solutions were not sufficient to 
solve the problem, Incubation seeks new possibilities building a number of novel options. 
When a potential solution appears to fit the problem, that idea is raised to conscious 
consideration through a flash of Insight. Evaluation is then applied, as an internal process 
during which the individual considers whether an idea is worth pursuing by referencing 
her/his ―internalized criteria of the domain, and the internalized opinion of the field‖ as a 
basis for considering if the idea is useful in relation to the identified problem 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1996: 80). This phase of Evaluation occurs before an idea is shared 
with others and serves as an internal gatekeeper. Csikszentmihalyi (1996: 116) holds that 
to be effective at generating creative ideas through anything but luck, it is necessary to 
have ―the ability to separate bad ideas from the good ones...to know in advance what is 
feasible and what will work, without having to suffer the consequences‖ of bad external 
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evaluations and rejection from the Field. The final phase of Elaboration usually takes the 
longest time. During this stage the idea is refined, tested and codified before being shared 
with others. To be considered creative, the output (idea or product) of the Elaboration 
phase must become accepted by the Field and have an influence on the focal Domain.  
Each of these five process models of creativity outlines a set of conceptual steps  
or phases a person goes through in developing a potentially creative idea.  These stages 
and the stated definition of creativity associated with them is outlined in Table 1. While 
the name and specific description of each phase may vary between models, there is a 
consistent inclusion of an internal evaluation or validation stage in the process before an 
idea or product is shared with others.  The criteria against which ideas are evaluated share 
some common descriptions across these models. In general, these criteria can be framed 
in terms of whether the idea is a new and useful solution to the problem put forward at 
the beginning of the creative process. If the idea is already known (stated or produced) 
then it is not new and does not present an additional option to the identified problem. 
Likewise, if the idea does not solve the described problem or fit the needs or context then 
the idea is not useful.  If the idea generated does not meet either of these criteria from the 
view point of the person generating potential solutions then most of these models indicate 
a failed process and either the process is restarted or abandoned. 
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Table 1: Summary Table of Process Models Highlighting Evaluation Stage and Creativity 
Definition 
Model Stages (Evaluation Stage in Bold) Definition of Creativity 
Wallas   Preparation,  
 Incubation,  
 Illumination,  
 Verification 
―...the making of a new generalization or 
invention, or the poetical expression of a new 
idea‖ (1926: 79) 
Hogarth   Preparation 
  Production 
  Evaluation 
  Implementation 
―...when ideas, ‗things‘ or associations are 
produced in some new combination that is either 
useful or appropriate for a particular problem or 
purpose‖ (1980:111) 
Amabile   Problem/ Task Identification, 
 Preparation 
 Response Generation 
 Response Validation/ 
Communication 
 Outcome 
―A product or response will be judged as creative 
to the extent that (a) it is both a novel and 
appropriate, useful, correct or valuable response to 
the task at hand, and (b) the task is heuristic rather 
than algorithmic‖ (1996: 35) 
Staw   Variation 
 Selective Retention 
―...as a product of variation and selective retention 
processes‖ (1990: 289) 
Csiksentmihalyi   Preparation 
 Incubation 
 Insight 
 Evaluation 
 Elaboration 
―to bring into existence something genuinely new 
that is valued enough to be added to the culture‖ 
(1996: 25) 
 
External Evaluation 
 The evaluation phases in these process models are a filtering process for 
determining which ideas meet the criteria for creativity within a particular context. While 
the evaluation phase discussed in the process models of creativity is often an internal 
process, many of the conceptual frameworks of creativity developed alongside these 
process models include an external evaluation component. Hogarth (1980) specifically 
includes an Implementation phase in which an idea is communicated to others in an effort 
to build social support (agreement that the idea is a creative solution) for the idea. 
Amabile‘s (1983, 1996) conceptual definition relies on external validation of outcomes of 
the creative process to ultimately determine if the solution proposed is accepted as 
creative. A person generating solutions may think an outcome is creative (after self 
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evaluating) but the idea is not truly considered creative until it is confirmed by external 
evaluation. This point is clearly stated by Amabile in that: ―A product or response is 
creative to the extent that appropriate observers independently agree it is creative‖ (1996: 
33). Staw‘s (1990) model for the individual creative process is extended in the same 
paper to organizations, where Staw identifies that ideas must build support and approval 
of others to survive and ultimately be accepted within an organization. This concept that 
ideas are generated individually but then must pass external evaluation and build support 
to be socially recognized, has been put forward in other works on the relationship 
between creativity and innovation (Scott & Bruce, 1994, West , 2002). 
Csikszentmihalyi‘s (1996) Systems Model requires that an idea be accepted as creative 
by an external field of gatekeepers (experts) before it is considered to be creative. In 
judging whether an idea is new and valuable, a reference to some standard must be 
applied and for Csikszentmihalyi that standard is a social evaluation; as ―creativity does 
not happen inside people‘s heads, but rather in the interaction between a person‘s 
thoughts and a sociocultural context‖ (1996: 22). The likelihood that an individual will 
develop ideas that are externally (socially) validated as creative is related to the extent to 
which that person internalizes the criteria used by the external system (e.g., Amabile, 
1983, 1996; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Campbell, 1960; Staw, 1990).  
Evaluation is central to the contextual nature of creativity. During early 
conceptualizations of creativity, a criterion problem was identified in trying to build an 
ultimate standard for how to assess creative people and products across all domains of 
human experience from arts to science (Shapiro, 1968). The grounding of creativity in a 
social context and evaluative process allows for the consideration of creativity as a 
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concept across potentially incommensurate domains. Shapiro (1968: 15) in offering a 
practical definition of creativity stated that: 
Creativity is a potential capacity by means of which an individual may produce 
something original that serves to fill a gap in a particular field of human endeavour. 
The degree of creativity expressed can be roughly gauged by the magnitude of the 
effect that the product has on the field, in the sense of the changes introduced into the 
traditional state of knowledge or modes of expression, formerly characterizing that 
field.  
Amabile (1996: 38) stated this contextual bounding of creativity and creativity 
assessments as: 
...creativity assessments must ultimately, be socially, culturally, and historically 
bound. It is impossible to assess the novelty of a product without some knowledge of 
what exists in a domain at a particular time. It is impossible to assess appropriateness 
without some knowledge of utility or meaning in a particular context. And it is 
impossible for these assessments to be made—or indeed for creative products 
themselves to be made—in a cultural, social, or historical vacuum. 
 
Without objective criteria to bound creativity, a reliance on social agreement has 
been put forward as a viable valid substitute in conceptualizations of the construct of 
creativity (e.g., Amabile, 1982; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Shapiro, 1968). This reliance on 
social agreement is based on the assumption that the criteria being used to externally 
evaluate an idea, product, or person as creative is common within a particular context. 
Furthermore, generalizations of creativity across contexts rest on the assumption that 
these criteria are similar across contexts. This commonality of criteria extends to both the 
relative levels of novelty and usefulness, as well as the weighting of each dimension as 
they are combined. While novelty and usefulness are broadly identified as the key 
elements of these conceptual definitions of creativity (e.g.; Amabile, 1996; George, 2007; 
Mumford, 2003), exactly how these dimensions are conceptually combined is unclear. 
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Dimensions 
When Guilford refocused psychology research on the topic of creativity in his 
American Psychological Association Presidential address, he stressed that the novelty 
component of creativity be bounded ―...under some degree by evaluative restraint‖ (1950: 
453). Soon after Guilford‘s call for more investigation into creativity, Stein produced this 
definition: ―The creative work is a novel work that is accepted as tenable or useful or 
satisfying by a group in some point in time‖ (1953: 311). To broad agreement, this 
combination of novelty and usefulness within context has been used as a common 
theoretical definition for creativity research over the last few decades (Mumford, 2003). 
Theoretically, the definition of creativity as an output is most often stated as: an idea, 
product, or process that is both novel and useful (e.g., George, 2007; Runco, 2004; 
Shalley et al., 2004). How creativity is conceptually defined is critical to understanding 
what is being judged when a person, product, process, or idea is identified as creative 
(Kampylis & Valtanen, 2010). This theoretical definition of creativity implies that a 
judgment of creativity is composed of a combination of evaluations of novelty and 
usefulness. 
The multidimensional nature of creativity, in requiring both novelty and usefulness 
to be present, complicates this well established theoretical definition. The requirement for 
both components of novelty and usefulness to be present has been stated very clearly in 
the literature. George stated that ―...to be considered creative, ideas must be both new and 
seen as having the potential to create value for organizations...‖ (2007: 441). This 
requirement was stated even more strongly by Zhou & Oldham (2001: 152), who wrote 
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that ―...both originality and usefulness are necessary conditions for an outcome to be 
considered creative‖. Creativity is not found in ideas that are just novel or just useful; 
both criteria must be present for an idea to be considered creative (e.g. Amabile, 1996; 
George, 2007; Shalley et al., 2004). This required combination of novelty and usefulness 
criteria is also used by the U.S. Patent Office in considering patent applications in that 
―patents are provided for a new, nonobvious and useful...‖ invention (U.S. Patent Office, 
2011). 
An understanding of these two dimensions of creativity is thus necessary to fully 
consider how creativity is defined. A consideration of novelty was stated by Stein (1953: 
311) as ―the extent to which work is novel depends on the extent to which it deviates 
from the traditional or status quo‖. Stein (1953) highlighted that for an idea to be useful it 
must be put forward to a group for testing and validation that the idea satisfactorily meets 
the group‘s needs.  Within organizations, the criteria of novelty and usefulness have been 
defined as: ―Ideas are considered novel if they are unique relative to other ideas currently 
available in the organization. Ideas are considered useful if they have the potential for 
direct or indirect value to the organization, in either the short- or long-term‖ (Shalley et 
al., 2004). Novelty has been further defined as the relative originality or unusualness of a 
potential solution, or an idea ―...which other people would be unlikely to think of‖ 
(Harrington, 1975: 438). In a paper on managerial decision making and creativity, Ford 
and Gioia (2000: 715) defined novelty ―...as the extent to which a decision was unusual 
within the context of their organization...‖ and usefulness ―...as the extent to which a 
decision accomplished the objectives desired...‖ within the context.  A recent review of 
theoretical definitions of creativity identified the common terms associated and used 
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interchangeably with each facet as: 1) novel, original, new, unexpected, different, unique, 
and unconventional and 2) appropriate, useful, valuable, significant, effective, relevant, 
and functional (Kampylis & Valtanen, 2010).  
While these components are clearly part of how creativity is conceptually defined, 
exactly how these two components of novelty and usefulness combine to render 
judgments of creativity is not clear at all (Litchfield, 2008). Using the most often stated 
definition of creativity, it would appear that evaluations of novelty and usefulness have a 
fixed relationship with judgments of overall creativity.  Yet, exactly what form that 
relationship takes has not been clearly specified (Shalley & Zhou, 2008; Zhou & Shalley, 
2003).  
Figure 1 depicts two common theoretical models of the relationship between 
novelty, usefulness, and creativity. The first is a multiplicative relationship in which a 
moderated model is expressed. This model is often assumed when multiple components 
are required and none are individually sufficient for the emergence of the resultant 
construct (Amabile, 1996). The relationship of novelty to creativity and the relationship 
of usefulness to creativity depend on the co-existence of the other relationship. This 
multiplicative (interactional) model is the default assumed relationship between novelty 
and usefulness in forming creativity judgments (e.g. George, 2007; Litchfield, 2008; 
Plucker Beghetto, & Dow, 2004; Runco & Charles, 1993). An idea judged to not be 
novel or not be useful in this model would result in that idea not being judged creative. 
However, if both components of novelty and usefulness are present (>0) even at low 
levels, then creativity is expected to be present even at nominal levels. This is consistent 
with a view that creativity can be considered a continuous construct existing at very low 
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as well as extremely high levels and all points in between (e.g. Amabile, 1996; Guilford, 
1950; Torrance, 1965). The second theoretical model that describes a less restrictive 
relationship is an additive model, in which evaluations of novelty and usefulness 
contribute independently to judgments of creativity (Ford & Gioia, 2000; Zhou & 
Shalley, 2003). This model represents separate main effects for both components on 
creativity as a compensatory model, but does not capture the requirement that both be 
present unless some sort of threshold approach is considered (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987, 
1991). While this model is not as common as the multiplicative model, there is empirical 
support for this conceptualization of a simple main effects relationship (Paletz & Peng, 
2008; Runco & Charles, 1993; Ford & Gioia, 2000).  
 
Figure 1: Theoretical Relationships between Novelty, Usefulness, and Creativity 
 
 Assumptions 
 The ambiguity of how novelty and usefulness are related to overall creativity is a 
fundamental problem with current theoretical conceptualizations. Amabile (1996: 38) 
drives this point home when she wrote that, ―essentially, the conceptual definition rests 
on assumptions about what observers are responding to when they identify a product as 
Usefulness 
Novelty Creativity 
Usefulness 
Novelty 
Creativity 
Multiplicative Relationship Additive Relationship 
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highly creative‖. When a researcher claims that some practical intervention or factor is 
related to creativity, how is creativity being defined by that researcher? Is creativity 
theoretically the same across different situations? If so, then a clarification of how 
evaluations of novelty and usefulness are combined to render a judgment of creativity 
should be incorporated into a refined theoretical definition of the construct (Schwab, 
1980). However, this appears to be an untested assumption in that, ―...theorizing and 
research on creativity tends to make the implicit assumption that the same causal factors 
will operate in a similar manner regardless of the type of creativity that occurs or that 
researchers are studying...‖ (George, 2007: 442). This implicit assumption hampers a 
fuller exploration and clearer understanding of creativity as a construct (Plucker et al., 
2004; Unsworth, 2001).  
This broad conceptual assumption often leaves discourses on creativity 
incommensurate as ―researchers may be discussing completely different topics, or at least 
very different perspectives of creativity‖ (Plucker et al., 2004). While novelty and 
usefulness are common components of creativity definitions, these terms are not 
frequently specified and this ambiguity challenges the clarity of what theorists and 
researchers mean when they refer to creativity (Kampylis & Valtanen, 2010). There may 
be strong consensus as to the major components of creativity (e.g. Mumford, 2003; 
Shalley et al., 2004); however, exactly what creativity means theoretically is far from 
clear (e.g. George, 2007; Kampylis & Valtanen, 2010; Plucker et al., 2004; Zhou & 
Shalley, 2003).  
I would propose that creativity can be more broadly defined as a contextually 
based social judgment generated from a consideration of several contextually relevant 
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factors most often including novelty and usefulness. This puts the definition back in-line 
with Guildford‘s (1950), of novelty bounded by other considerations. In this way novelty 
and usefulness are removed from a fixed relationship and are merely the strongest 
predictors of a creativity judgment. This definition and clarification are more flexible 
when it comes to defining creativity. The relationship is not built upon assumptions of 
equal contribution or stability, but rather allows for the exploration of what is meant by 
creativity in any given situation and allows for other factors to be included in the 
conceptual determination of creativity as well as considered operationally.  
  
  
 
III.  CREATIVITY OPERATIONALLY CONSIDERED 
 
Now that I have considered how novelty and usefulness contribute to creativity 
theoretically, I would like to explore how these dimensions may be considered 
operationally in measuring creativity.  Conceptually creativity is a paradox of wide 
agreement and continuing ambiguity; this paradox carries over to how creativity is most 
often operationalized. Creativity has been studied from multiple perspectives: from 
reviewing prominent creative biographies (e.g., Barron, 1968; Mackinnon, 1962; 
Simonton, 1975), to attempting to identify a creative personality type (Gough, 1979; 
Torrance & Khatena, 1970; Rimm & Davis, 1976), and assessing creative cognitive 
processing (Kirton, 1976; Miller, 1986). These attempts to discover a universal creative 
type have often struggled to build a framework consistent across contexts (Runco, 2004; 
Shapiro, 1968), and thus the measurement of the output of the creative process has met 
with more acceptance as a viable avenue for considering creativity (e.g., Amabile, 1996; 
Shalley & Zhou, 2008). Operationalizing creativity within its context is best achieved by 
measuring the output of the creative process (e.g., Guilford, 1950; O‘Quin & Besemer, 
1989; Sternberg, 1999). 
When researchers consider creativity as an outcome, they typically conceptualize 
it as a product or idea that is both novel/original and useful/appropriate (e.g., Amabile, 
1996; Feist & Barron, 2003; Shalley, 1991). Although there is considerable agreement on 
this conceptualization, many researchers struggle with defining and operationalizing 
creativity across contexts (e.g. Amabile & Mueller, 2008; George, 2007; Guilford, 1950; 
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Torrance, 2003). Creativity researchers have explored how individual differences, 
cognitive processes, types of motivations, and contextual factors relate to creative 
outcomes based primarily on subjective judgments of overall creativity (e.g., Amabile & 
Mueller, 2008; Shalley et al., 2004). 
When Guilford (1950) refocused creativity research away from a consideration of 
universal standard creativity trait, comparable to measures of I.Q. and personality, to 
context dependent evaluations of the outcomes of the creative process, he began a process 
of operationalizing creativity centered on the product or ideas produced by creative 
activity. In developing a factorial approach to considering creativity, Guilford (1957) 
identified a way to operationalize the measurement of creativity through the factors of 
fluency, flexibility, and originality. He stated that primary mental abilities and motivation 
are necessary but not sufficient for creative production, while ―the factors of fluency, 
flexibility, and originality and the like are not only necessary but, when possessed in 
sufficient amounts, are sufficient‖ (1957: 117). While these factors are associated with 
creativity, they are most relevant to measuring only one dimension, novelty. Guilford and 
coauthors (Wilson, Guilford, & Christensen, 1953) focused on the originality of ideas as 
the basis for his measurement of creativity even though he had earlier included a 
usefulness component in the model by restricting his conceptual definition of creativity to 
new ideas that had relevance within context (Guilford, 1950). This initial measurement 
model was extended to include elaboration in further descriptions of tasks used to elicit 
creative products (Guilford, 1967). 
Torrance (1974) continued working with this measurement model and formalized 
a series of creativity tasks with the development of the Torrance Test of Creative 
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Thinking.  A description of how these measures are operationalized is noted in an early 
work from Torrance (1965:669): 
The number of relevant responses produced by a subject yields one measure of 
ideational fluency. The number of shifts in thinking or number of different 
categories of questions, causes, or consequences gives one measure of flexibility. 
The statistical infrequency of these questions, causes, or consequences or the 
extent to which the response represents a mental leap or departure from the 
obvious and commonplace gives one measure of originality. The detail and 
specificity incorporated into the questions and hypotheses provide one measure of 
ability to elaborate.  
  
This operationalization of creativity put forward by Torrance to measure creative 
potential through examining individual responses to open-ended tasks is heavily focused 
on the novelty component of creativity with the only nod to usefulness being the word 
‗relevant‘ in the measure of fluency. This consideration of counting the breadth of ideas 
generated as a proxy for creativity without direct measurement of usefulness is based on a 
belief that the more potential ideas explored the greater the likelihood that a creative 
response will be generated (e.g., Campbell, 1960; Osborn, 1953; Shalley, 1991). It is also 
important to note that this approach to measuring creativity, while perhaps appearing 
objective, is based on a comparison of individual test responses to a large pool of 
responses provided by others who have taken the test. This norming of the data acts as a 
subjective societal frame for judging creativity. 
Creativity has also been assessed within organizations on an individual basis by 
having supervisors and coworkers evaluate the creativity of other employees. Several 
scales have been developed to measure perceptions of employee creative behavior. Some 
of these recently developed scales (George & Zhou, 2001; Oldham & Cummings, 1996; 
Tierney, Farmer, & Graen, 1999; Scott & Bruce, 1994) ask respondents to rate the 
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behavior of an employee or coworker with a number of questions covering overall 
creativity, novelty, and usefulness to a lesser extent. These scales are based on the 
external perceptions of an individual‘s creativity using subjective judgments within the 
context of the organization and the specific person‘s job. While these scales might use 
items focused on both the dimensions as well as overall creativity, they are designed to be 
averaged into one global measure of overall creativity.   
This focus on overall creativity is continued in the Consensual Assessment 
Technique (CAT) as proposed and refined by Amabile (1982, 1983, 1996). This method 
for measuring creativity operates through the agreement of several independent judges‘ 
evaluations of creativity as evidenced in products or ideas generated by individuals or 
groups. This approach was meant to bring theoretical and operational definitions into 
alignment (Amabile, 1982, 1983). Grounding the CAT is an operational definition stated 
as; ―A product or response is creative to the extent that appropriate observers 
independently agree it is creative‖ (Amabile, 1982: 1001). This definition is based on the 
assumption that ―although creativity in a product may be difficult to characterize in terms 
of specific features, it is something that people can recognize when they see it‖ (Amabile, 
1982: 1001). Judges are asked to rate the overall creativity of a product or response and 
the reliability of this operationalization is based on the extent that those judging the 
creativity of a product or response agree in their assessment giving social validation to 
their combined judgment. In describing this CAT procedure, Amabile (1996) specifically 
recommends that judges not be given formal definitions of creativity but are intentionally 
left to use their own implicit criteria. While judges may statistically arrive at the same 
rating for a product, this technique relies ―on the assumption that experts in a domain do 
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share creativity criteria to a reasonable degree‖ (Amabile, 1996: 42). This assumption is 
critical in that conceptually creativity is formed by combining separate evaluations of 
novelty and usefulness, yet these components are not considered directly in the 
operationalization through expert consensus of overall creativity.  
Amabile (1996: 61) revised her requirement that only experts should be used as 
judges in stating, ―the only requirement is a familiarity with the domain of endeavor in 
which the product was made‖. This is tempered in that judges are expected to have a 
level of familiarity with the domain to be judged at or above the level of those whose 
products are being judged. This contextual framing of creativity judgments is extended 
using the CAT, in that judges are asked to base evaluations of creativity on a comparison 
of products or responses generated within the same context (Amabile, 1996). This 
contextual bounding allows poems written by kindergartners to be evaluated for 
creativity relative to other poems written by kindergartners, while judging the creativity 
of professional authors references a different set of comparables.  While this allows 
creativity to be assessed across the spectrum of human experience, this technique ―does 
not produce any kind of standardized scoring system that might allow comparisons to be 
made across settings‖ (Kaufman, Baer, & Cole, 2009: 224).  
While Amabile‘s (1996) description of this technique recommends exploring 
what judges mean when they are rating something as creative, the majority of this 
research is reported as only overall creativity (e.g., Dean, Hender, Rodgers, & Santanen, 
2006; Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Shalley & Zhou, 2008; Shalley et al., 2004). It is also 
suggested that depending on the nature of the task, other dimensions of the product might 
be rated, such as technical goodness or aesthetic value. These were suggested to test to 
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see if ―judges might be rating something as ‗creative‘ simply because they like it or 
because they find it to be technically well done‖ (Amabile, 1996: 43). While this is one 
way to approach the problem of clarifying what is meant by overall creativity, another 
option gaining acceptance is using multiple measures of creativity by combining CAT 
ratings, self-ratings, and/or supervisor evaluations with proxies for creative 
accomplishment through the counting of patents, publications, or awards (Fiest & Barron, 
2003; Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Plucker, 2004; Runco, 2004). 
While the CAT has been extended to include measures of related constructs 
(Dollinger & Shafran, 2005; Brinkman, 1999), the use of this technique to measure both 
of creativity‘s components, novelty and usefulness, is rare (Kilgour & Koslow, 2009; 
Reitzschel, Nijstad, & Stroebe, 2006, 2010; Zhou & Oldham, 2001; Zhou & Shalley, 
2003). The Creative Product Semantic Scale (Besemer & O‘Quin, 1986; O‘Quin & 
Besemer, 1989) was designed to measure three dimensions of creativity when 
considering products, but its scales of Novelty, Elaboration/Synthesis, and Resolution do 
not map clearly onto common conceptual definitions and a recent study using a modified 
version of this scale found that the two factor (novelty and usefulness) model was a better 
fit for predicting creativity (Sullivan & Ford, 2010). Connecting the conceptual definition 
of novelty and usefulness evaluations forming a judgment of creativity to a similar 
measurement model would help to strengthen our understanding of the construct 
(Schwab, 1980; Unsworth, 2001). Measuring and reporting both components as well as 
overall creativity in the same study is not standard practice but has been used to better 
understand the contributions of each component to overall judgments of creativity (Ford 
& Gioia, 2000; Paletz & Peng, 2008; Runco & Charles, 1993; Sullivan & Ford, 2010). 
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The results of these few studies have supported the independent nature of the dimensions 
of novelty and usefulness relating to overall creativity through an independent main 
effects model. 
A modified policy capturing study conducted by Runco and Charles, tested the 
relationship of originality (novelty) and appropriateness (usefulness) with creativity by 
having participants rate sets of ideas submitted as answers to a divergent thinking task of 
―list all the square things you can think of or list all the things that move on 
wheels‖(1993: 540). These findings found consistent support for originality as a predictor 
of creativity, but only very limited support for a significant relationship between 
appropriateness and creativity. Casting doubt on the viability of multiplicative 
composites, only one out of fifteen cases evidenced significant support for the interaction 
of originality and appropriateness. In some cases, there was evidence of an inverse 
relationship between appropriateness and originality. However, the authors cautioned the 
generalization of these results ―in part because ideas rather than some more concrete 
products (e.g. artworks) were being judged‖ (Runco & Charles, 1993: 545).  
A study of managerial decision making by Ford and Gioia, found that in 
―organizational domains novelty and value are loosely coupled outcomes affected by 
relatively independent constellations of influences‖ (2000:727). In looking at creative and 
non-creative decisions reported by senior managers from a broad professional 
background, the authors identified seven variables that discriminated decisions at 
different levels of creativity. When four of these variables influenced the novelty 
dimension and three distinguished the value dimension the authors held that this ―pattern 
of results reveals creativity to be multidimensional phenomenon, and shows that those 
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dimensions are affected by markedly different process that are essentially independent of 
each other‖ (Ford & Gioia, 2000: 723). By showing that different antecedents drive 
different dimensions of creativity, it is conceivable that a focus on any antecedent in 
particular could stress that dimension in making an evaluation of creativity.  
The investigation into how novelty and usefulness combine to form judgments of 
creativity took another important step with the work of Paletz and Peng (2008) applying a 
cross-cultural lens in considering the American, Japanese and Chinese perspectives. Their 
research showed that judgments of creativity are in some ways consistent across cultures, 
in that the influence of novelty on judgments of creativity was stable across cultures. 
However, the researchers found that appropriateness was more influential in creativity 
judgments for American and Japanese participants. In considering how both novelty and 
appropriateness were related to judgments of creativity of a product and desire for that 
product, this research found that ―novelty was more important overall for creativity and 
appropriateness was more important for desire‖ (2008: 296). These results appear to 
indicate a slight difference between cultures in how creativity is implicitly defined and 
begin to undercut the assumption of a stable relationship of novelty and usefulness to 
overall creativity. 
In an effort to test the multifaceted nature of the construct of creativity, Sullivan 
and Ford (2010) conducted two experiments to explore how creativity is defined when 
people evaluate creative products. The authors had students rate both ideas for a new 
business and a new advertising campaign, as well as had professional artists rate a piece 
of print artwork. Stimuli were rated on multiple item measures of creativity, novelty, 
usefulness, and stylistic appeal. The results across all three ratings was novelty and 
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usefulness measures loaded on separate factors and that these two factors together 
predicted a better fit to overall creativity than did either a single combined factor or with 
a third factor of stylistic appeal added to the model. In supporting a multifaceted 
conceptualization of creativity as a function of novelty and usefulness evaluations, the 
authors identified a next step as ―understanding the relative weight of novelty and 
usefulness assessments‖ (Sullivan & Ford, 2010: 518). In exploring the multidimensional 
structure of the construct of creativity, the authors identified ―an apparent inconsistency 
between how the construct of organizational creativity is defined and how it is measured‖ 
(2010: 506). 
This research and other reviews (e.g, George, 2007; Mumford, 2003; Shapiro, 
1968) show that the alignment of theoretical and operational definitions of creativity is 
far from clear, in that conceptually creativity is presented as a complex construct but that 
complexity is often ignored operationally. This lack of clarity as to what is being studied 
conceptually and what is being measured empirically influences the validity of 
generalizing creativity research. A study looking to test a theoretical relationship of some 
other construct with creativity that only measures the component of novelty is misleading 
when the findings are reported as ‗creativity‘. Comparing findings from studies utilizing 
even slightly different conceptual and operational definitions of creativity can cause great 
conflict between researchers, where the reason for differential findings may be because 
they are investigating different focal phenomena using the same name - Creativity 
(Hennessey & Amabile, 2010). This conflict and lack of clarity has been acknowledged 
between these two explicit definitional levels (Runco, 2007), yet there is often conflict at 
a third level of abstraction that is little discussed. Inconsistencies between explicit 
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definitions stated by researchers and the implicit definitions of creativity utilized by 
judges in experiments and lay persons in practice can also confound our broader 
understanding of the construct of creativity.  
To clarify how this construct is operationalized, one must measure not just one 
level of the construct (global or facet) but both. I propose a measurement model to 
capture scales on all three focal variables and any other relevant constructs that are 
considered to be related to creativity ratings in a particular instance or context. If no 
additional variables are included the error term will include the unexplained variance not 
captured by the primary facets of novelty and usefulness. The measurement model I am 
proposing and using in this study is shown below in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Proposed Measurement Model between Novelty, Usefulness, and Creativity 
 
 
  
 
 
IV.  GLOBAL MEASURES AND IMPLICIT DEFINITIONS 
 
While conceptual and operational definitions are often explicitly spelled out in a 
research effort, implicit theories and definitions are ―constructions by people (whether 
psychologists or laypersons) that reside in the minds of these individuals‖ (Sternberg, 
1985). Even though explicit definitions may be clearly stated in the research proposal or 
held clearly in the mind of a corporate manager, that does not ensure that these same 
definitions are used by others working on the same project (Cronin & Weingart, 2007; 
Litchfield, 2007). When creativity is conceptually defined as a multidimensional 
construct and operationalized primarily through a unitary global measure, if one is to 
claim that different studies are addressing the same phenomena then one must assume 
that the dimensions of novelty and usefulness combine in a stable fashion during the 
application of implicit definitions in rendering creativity judgments. This assumption 
must hold for the usage of the term ‗creativity‘ to be consistent across study contexts. 
This problem is exacerbated by the reliance on subjective ratings for which judges use 
their own implicit definitions as evaluation criteria (e.g. Amabile, 1996). Assuming that 
novelty and usefulness combine in a stable consistently weighted fashion to form 
creativity judgments is a testable assumption. However, this may necessitate a more 
complex measurement model to accurately align explicit and implicit definitions of 
creativity. 
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Treating creativity as a global construct has led to ambiguity in generalizing 
findings from one study context to another (Dean, Hender, Rodgers, & Santanen, 2006). 
There is an ongoing debate about when to consider multidimensional constructs at a 
global or facet level of measurement, with benefits and drawbacks identified for both 
approaches (e.g., Bagozzi & Edwards, 1998; Edwards, 2001; Ironson, Smith, Brannick, 
Gibson, & Paul, 1989; Wanous, Reichers, & Hudy, 1997). Considering creativity as a 
subjective global construct raises questions about what is being measured and if different 
creativity studies are measuring the same thing (Ford & Gioia, 2000). ―An intriguing and 
still unanswered question about the use of subjective judgments is, what, exactly, do 
judges mean when they call something ‗creative‘?‖ (Amabile, 1996: 31). This lack of 
operational clarity on how creativity is defined by those providing the subjective 
judgments of creativity limits the testing of theory and the programmatic advancement of 
creativity research (George, 2007; Unsworth, 2001).  
While researchers theoretically define creativity as being composed of novelty 
and usefulness, operationally these components are ignored when global measures are 
used. This requires an assumption that judges, expert or not, are implicitly using these 
criteria in a consistent fashion when making subjective creativity judgments. Even if a 
researcher finds acceptable statistical levels of within rater agreement on measures of 
overall creativity, there is no assurance that the two raters agree on the criteria for these 
judgments. Consider Figure 3, which shows the range (using a 5-point Likert scale where 
0 = ―None‖ & 4 = ―Extreme‖) of both multiplicative and additive conceptualizations of 
how novelty and usefulness evaluations combine to render a creativity judgment. Under 
both of these models, if Judge 1 believed an idea was extremely novel (rating of 4) and 
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average on usefulness (rating of 2) and Judge 2 believed the same idea was average for 
novelty (rating of 2) and extremely useful (rating of 4), they would both arrive at 
identical creativity ratings (8 for the multiplicative and 6 for the additive). Researchers 
would incorrectly assume that these judges to be in complete agreement as to the how the 
idea is creative, when in fact there are meaningful differences in how each judge views 
the idea‘s creativity.  
Figure 3: Multiplicative and Additive Models‘ Potential Creativity Scores 
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Utilizing global measures of a multidimensional construct leads to ambiguous 
findings, in that ―variation in a multidimensional construct may imply variation in any or 
all of its dimensions‖ (Edwards, 2001: 145). Several reviews have proposed that 
independent ratings for novelty and usefulness might be combined via addition or 
multiplication to generate a composite unitary measure of creativity (Shalley & Zhou, 
2008; Shalley et al., 2004; Zhou & Shalley, 2003) and scales have been developed that 
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use this approach (Besemer & O‘Quin, 1986; O‘Quin & Besemer, 1989). The issue with 
combining multiple dimensions to form a resulting construct is that this construct will be 
essentially ambiguous (Edwards, 2011). Additionally, this combinational approach stands 
in contrast to empirical evidence showing individual main effects for novelty and 
usefulness contributing to creativity judgments (Paletz & Peng, 2008; Runco & Charles, 
1993) and measured in isolation it is unclear how and with what weights the components 
should be combined to accurately compute a judgment of creativity. Yet it should be 
clear that current global operationalizations ―conflate novelty and value‖ in considering 
creativity (Ford & Gioia, 2000: 723). 
There is, however, a potential benefit to measuring overall creativity and not just 
its components. Criteria beyond novelty and usefulness might be included when people 
make evaluations of creativity (Amabile, 1996; Runco & Charles, 1993). Overall ratings 
of creativity as a global measure may be capturing additional criteria specific to a 
particular context and thus may capture a ―holistic representation of complex 
phenomena‖ (Edwards, 2001: 145). Restricting creativity to a combination of measures 
of novelty and usefulness may oversimplify this construct and omit other relevant facets 
as has been described with other combinational measures (Scarpello & Campbell, 1983). 
If we are to agree that creativity is a context dependent social judgment (Amabile, 1996; 
Sternberg, 1999), then identifying what goes into making those judgments is essential to 
specifying this construct and generalizing research findings related to creativity.  
In order to justify and not just assume the primacy of novelty and usefulness in 
making creativity judgments we should test the extent to which these components 
contribute to the measurement of overall creativity. Additionally, if creativity is just a 
  42 
fixed combination of these two components then why do we need a measure of overall 
creativity? There are two cases in which we might want to measure both the dimensions 
of novelty/ usefulness and overall creativity. First, if we are unsure of how novelty and 
usefulness should be combined (model and weightings) to represent creativity within a 
particular context then measuring the dimensions and overall creativity could allow us to 
deduce the combinational formula applicable in that situation. Second, if creativity is 
more than just a combination of novelty/ usefulness dimensions, measuring overall 
creativity will capture those unnamed dimensions, while measures of novelty/ usefulness 
can be used to clarify the contributions of each named dimension and partial out the 
potential contributions of unmeasured dimensions.  It would be important to know if 
creativity is only a combination of novelty and usefulness, or if something more, how 
much these two components contribute to an overall judgment of creativity. 
It is imperative for creativity researchers to understand how creativity is implicitly 
defined not only by supervisors who rate employees using creativity scales and judges 
who evaluate products using the CAT, but by an even broader population who might 
benefit from our research. The first two groups involve the internal validity of creativity 
research findings, while the third concerns the external validity of our findings. How the 
general public defines creativity influences the ways in which our findings are translated 
and generalized to inform a broader applied understanding of our research, a point often 
made with respect to general organizational behavior research (e.g., Rynes, 2007; Rynes 
et al., 2001). In using an operationalization that includes both global overall creativity 
and independent measures of novelty and usefulness dimensions, researchers can begin to 
not only understand how creativity is being implicitly defined by participants in our 
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studies but begin to offer more specificity and clarity when attempting to generalize our 
results. The translation of academic findings to inform practitioners and into generalized 
knowledge is a broad-based goal of organizational research (Rynes, 2007) and this is 
even more important for creativity researchers as organizations become increasingly 
dependent on new ideas and innovation for creating value (Kanter, 1988; Tushman & 
O‘Reilly, 1996; Woodman, Sawyer, & Griffin, 1993). 
Understanding how people implicitly define creativity can help clarify what our 
raters are actually judging when they evaluate something as creative (Amabile, 1996). 
How novelty and usefulness are combined to render a judgment of creativity might 
influence whether an idea is supported or rejected within an organizational context 
(Goldenberg, Lehmann, & Mazursky, 2001; Haradon & Douglas, 2001; March, 2006). 
While researchers have often assumed that judgments of creativity are generated through 
evaluations of the ―dimensions of originality and feasibility, this does not mean that ‗lay‘ 
participants will use these criteria when making their selections‖ (Reitzschel et al., 2010: 
49). This assumption gets even more constraining when researchers do not measure how 
novelty and usefulness combine to generate judgments of creativity, in that this presumes 
that both dimensions contribute equally or at the very least are related in a stable fashion 
to overall creativity.  
Organizations and groups often have very different priorities when it comes to 
acceptable levels of novelty and usefulness (Ford & Gioia, 2000; Litchfield, 2007) and 
priorities of exploration and exploitation (e.g., Benner & Tushman, 2003; March, 1991; 
Smith & Tushman, 2005). Thus, it is rational to think that individuals could have 
different priorities in weighting these two goals in creativity generation and evaluation. 
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This differential weighting would make any assumption by researchers of a stable 
relationship between novelty and usefulness across studies problematic. Even between 
people in the same organization ―it is unwise to assume that multiple goals will survive 
the communication process intact and in the intervener‘s implicitly desired weighting‖ 
(Litchfield, 2008: 658). So if the contribution of individual evaluations of novelty and 
usefulness are not stable in rendering creativity judgments, then what might explain these 
differences? 
Weighting Dimensions  
One way to test if the relationships of the dimensions of novelty and usefulness to 
overall creativity are stable is to explore factors that might moderate those relationships. 
While plainly manipulating the directions for a task, by explicitly requesting novelty or 
usefulness, could increase the salience of one dimension or the other, this invocation of 
dimensions directly is not a fair test of creativity per se but more a test of demand 
characteristics. While goal direction and instructions have been a focal area for creativity 
researchers (e.g., Madjar & Shalley, 2008; Osborn, 1953; Rietzschel et al., 2010; Shalley, 
1991), showing that situational framing or contextual factors might impact the weighting 
of evaluations of novelty and usefulness in determining overall creativity judgments 
would be a strong case against assuming a stable relationship in defining this construct.   
Before considering how the weighting of evaluations of novelty and usefulness 
might change under different contextual conditions, it might be important to consider if 
novelty and usefulness are expected to be equal contributors to judgments of creativity. 
While creativity has been conceptualized as both novelty and usefulness, historically 
novelty has been given precedence. Guilford‘s (1950) early discussions of creativity 
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stressed the novelty component‘s association with creativity only bounded by usefulness 
considerations. Amabile (1996: 38) identified novelty ―as the most important criterion‖ 
for creativity. In considering criteria for judging an idea‘s creativity, two empirical 
studies, one by Runco and Charles (1993) and another by Rietzschel, Nijstad, and Stroebe 
(2010), found higher correlations between evaluations of novelty and creativity than 
between usefulness and creativity. While both of these studies used abstract laboratory 
tasks, it could be assumed that this primacy would carry over to considering the creativity 
in real world situations although perhaps not to an extreme extent (Ford & Gioia, 2000). 
In a review of implicit definitions of creativity found in research articles, novelty was the 
most common characteristic cited (Plucker et al., 2004).  
Considering this historic primacy of associating novelty with creativity, a decision 
making framework would support the trend that novelty will have a relatively stronger 
weight in determining judgments of creativity than usefulness. Based primarily on a 
foundation of bounded rationality (Simon, 1957), decision making research has shown 
that when presented with formulaic decision processes, people often simplify these 
decisions either consciously or unconsciously through biases and heuristics (e.g., 
Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011,Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). ―When faced with a 
complex problem, people employ a variety of heuristic procedures in order to simplify 
the representation and the evaluation of prospects‖ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Most 
often these heuristics are used as short-cuts to concerted rational decision making, and 
result in examining fewer criteria, relying on easy to access information, simplifying 
weighting of criteria, using less information, and examining fewer options (Shah & 
Oppenheimer, 2008). In applying these effort cutting processes, information that is most 
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prominent will receive greater weighting in a decision maker‘s judgments (e.g., Fiedler, 
2007; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Tversky, Sattah, & Solvic, 1988). As novelty is 
historically the most prominent dimension of creativity, it may be that in most cases or 
when considering a vast number of situations, evaluations of novelty will have a stronger 
weighting than evaluations of usefulness in judging the overall creativity of an idea or 
product.  However, the relationship between these two dimensions and creativity while 
unequal could still be relatively stable. Litchfield (2008) considered novelty and 
usefulness the dual goals of creativity.  Yet if creativity exists beyond these two 
dimensions, reaching a judgment on creativity may entail an even more complex decision 
process. Building off of established decision making theories, particularly those 
addressing heuristics and biases in making judgments, could offer a foundation for why 
the weighting of novelty or usefulness in making creativity judgments might not be 
stable. 
While there is evidence of a more prominent component garnering additional 
attention and weight during decision making activities (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; 
Tversky et al., 1988), the salience of a given dimension may be made more prominent 
through the availability of the dimension to be considered or recalled (Tversky & 
Khaneman, 1973).  More specifically, when people are asked to make a global judgment 
that may be influenced by multiple criteria, the criteria most recently considered assumes 
a disproportionately strong weighting in the resultant judgment (Kahneman, Krueger, 
Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2006; Schkade & Kahneman, 1998). This focusing is not 
only supported through cognitive decision process but also through motivated 
information processing. Bechtoldt, DeDreu, Nijstad, & Choi, ( 2010) found that group 
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norms favoring novelty or usefulness motivated people to attend to those aspects of 
creativity. This stronger weighting given to criteria occupying our focal attention is 
consistent across both cognitive processing and motivational information processing 
approaches (Kunda, 1990; Nickerson, 1998).   
Using this rationale, focusing a person‘s attention on either novelty or usefulness 
should increase the weighting of that factor when a judgment of creativity is made. 
Evidence of contextual or individual moderating factors would indicate that judgments of 
creativity are not comprised of a stable combination of separate evaluations of novelty 
and usefulness as currently assumed. Clearly stating a preference for one dimension or 
the other would surely influence that preferred dimensions weighting factor, but also 
restricts an individual‘s implicit definition explicitly. So what factors might subtly 
influence the balance with which novelty and usefulness are used to make creativity 
judgments in an everyday work context?  
I am primarily focused in this dissertation on variations in judgments of creativity 
made within a common domain and am seeking to relate this research to work 
organizations. Thus I considered several contextual factors that are within a manager‘s 
control through which they may influence the weighting of novelty and usefulness in 
making creativity judgments within the work place. Managers often have control over 
many aspects of an employee‘s work, from group composition to resource allocation, 
from goals and expectations to rewards, which may influence creativity at work (Shalley 
& Gilson, 2004). Many of these factors may potentially moderate the weighting of 
novelty and usefulness in relation to overall creativity.  
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Yet in applying a decision making frame on why the weightings of novelty and 
usefulness may vary in judging creativity through consideration of bounded rationality 
(Simon, 1958) and resulting information processing shortcuts (for a review see, 
Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011), I wanted to ground the beginning of this research effort 
in a contextual variable that is central to bounding the contextual frame of creativity 
evaluation and that consideration is time. Time may provide two powerful limitations on 
our processing of information related to creativity. First it can provide a limitation on the 
set of ideas considered to be within context and thus influence the set of possibilities that 
an idea is compared against. Second it may directly influence how long (and thus the 
amount) our cognitive resources can be focused on an evaluation of the creativity of an 
idea. Theoretically time is important from a decision making perspective as a frame and 
as a resource but it is also central to how creativity has been conceptualized. 
Returning to our conceptualization of creativity as being historically bound, time 
has an important effect on creativity and judgments of creativity (Amabile, 1996). It is 
noted that often creative ideas are recognized right away but only conferred later on as 
the ideas become broadly accepted (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Mainemelis, 2010). Some of 
the ideas that revolutionized their fields and continue to impact us today were initially 
rejected but later found prominence as foundations of their respective fields. Ideas from 
scientist like Galileo (heliocentrim), Nicola Tesla (alternating current), and Ignaz 
Semmelweis (antiseptic washing in medicine), were initially dismissed but later hailed as 
extremely creative concepts. Time appears to be an important consideration for 
evaluating creative ideas as ideas must be considered within an appropriate context so 
how we bound that context in time may influence what an idea or product may be 
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compared to in making that judgment. Managers often have control over an employee‘s 
consideration of time from multiple perspectives through time as a resource with work 
sequencing and resource allocation, and in considering time as a framing as effort is often 
directed through the use of short and long-term goals. Thus time is both a central 
contextual factor in the workplace and a bounding consideration for evaluation of 
creative ideas.  
In thinking of creativity generation, evaluation, and implementation as part of a 
broader innovation process, evaluation of potentially creative ideas may be considered an 
act of forecasting whether a generated idea would be novel and useful upon 
implementation (Mumford, Lonergan, & Scott, 2002). Managers seeking to evaluate 
potential new products or services are essentially making a creative judgment based on 
anticipated outcomes of implementation. With this in mind it may be helpful to reflect on 
how far out in time an idea is considered under and how close an individual is to the task 
or the implementation, when a judgment of its creativity is considered. This concept of 
focal length with respect to time and distance is also something that is controllable with 
managerial framing of a task. Organizations often direct activity toward six month 
production goals or five year strategic plans. This use of time frames directs attention and 
may influence creativity evaluations that are necessarily historically bound. Managers 
often also control assignment so work task and thus can control how closely one is tied to 
a specific effort or implementation. 
This line of thinking led me to consider time as a potentially potent moderator that 
could influence the weighting of novelty and usefulness in relation to judgments of 
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creativity. Time and relative responsibility for a task both represent types of distance 
from an activity. Theoretically, the distance one feels from a situation or task has been 
conceptualized by Construal Level Theory as psychological distance (Liberman & Trope, 
1998; Liberman, Trope, & Wakslak, 2007; Trope & Liberman, 2010) and has been 
shown to influence the way people attend to and process information. Psychological 
distance will thus be the potential moderator to be tested in this dissertation.  
Thus in an effort to explore the potential instability of the weighting of both 
novelty and usefulness in making creativity judgments, I would like to test the 
moderating influence of psychological distance on the salience of the dimensions of 
novelty and usefulness for judgments of overall creativity.  Testing the potential 
moderating effects provides a meaningful test of the assumed stability of the dimensions 
of novelty and usefulness in judgments of creativity, as well as extending the findings of 
previous research linking psychological distance (Förster et al., 2004; Jai, Hirt, & 
Karpen, 2009; Polman & Emich, 2011; Wiekens & Stapel, 2008) to creativity through 
differential weighting of the dimension of novelty and usefulness. 
  
  
 
 
V.  PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE  
 
Construal Level Theory (CLT) is a framework for understanding the linkage 
between psychological distance and the levels of abstraction used to process and interpret 
information (for reviews, Trope & Liberman, 2010; Trope, Liberman, & Wakslak, 2007). 
This theory posits that ―individuals use more abstract mental models, or higher level 
construals, to represent information about‖ (Trope & Liberman, 2003: 405) 
psychologically distant events. Trope and Liberman have defined psychological distance 
as ―a subjective experience that something is close or far away from the self, here, and 
now‖ (2010: 440). Consideration of psychological distance is egocentrically based, 
meaning that the perception of distance is referenced on the individual, their location, and 
the current time. As the self, physical location, and current time are reference points for 
determining distance, moving a focal event or object further away from any of these is 
expected to increase the psychological distance an individual feels from the focal event or 
object. 
CLT considers time (temporal distance from now), spatial (physical distance from 
the individual‘s location), and social (perceived difference from self) as three of the four 
dimensions on which psychological distances can change. The fourth way CLT envisions 
psychological distance can be changed is through hypotheticality. Hypotheticality is 
defined as ―the distinction between real and imagined objects and between probable and 
improbable events‖ (Trope & Liberman, 2010). It is considered a distance in that reality 
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is actually occurring (100% certainty) and events with lower probability of occurring are 
further (thus greater distance) from becoming reality than events with higher probability 
of occurring. While CLT assumes that distance dimensions are interchangeable, this 
assumption has yet to be tested. Several studies have found that invoking one distance 
engenders feelings of distance on other dimensions; increasing social distance has been 
shown to increase perceptions of spatial and temporal distance (Stephan, Liberman, & 
Trope, 2010); increasing spatial distance increased responses of perceived social distance 
(William & Bargh, 2008); and increasing hypotheticality increases perceptions of spatial, 
temporal, and social distance (Wakslak & Trope, 2009). Thus psychological distance can 
be considered as a more general manifestation resulting from variation on any one, some, 
or all of the aforementioned dimensions. 
―The basic premise of CLT is that distance is linked to level of mental construal, 
such that more distant objects will be construed at a higher level, and high-level construal 
will bring to mind more distant objects‖ (Trope & Liberman, 2010: 444). This theory 
states and empirical evidence (Bar-Anan, Liberman, & Trope, 2006; Liberman, Macrae, 
Sherman, & Trope, 2007) supports a reciprocal relationship between psychological 
distance and construal level. Such that greater psychological distance engenders higher 
levels of construal and higher levels of construal invoke feelings of greater psychological 
distance. If one were to consider the tree for the forest visual analogy (Dhar & Kim, 
2007; Trope & Liberman, 2010; Trope et al., 2007), from a proximal perspective, one can 
identify concrete specifics and complex details of the specific tree. In contrast, from a 
distance the details and specific of that same tree fade, while broader considerations and 
relationships become visible. This analogy works in reverse in that if you want to see the 
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details of a tree you need to get a closer look and if you want to see the whole forest you 
need to back away from any single tree. 
Levels of construal represent the mental model through which information is 
processed and interpreted; this cognitive lens allows one to focus on some types of 
information while obscuring others. Trope and Liberman outline the distinguishing 
aspects of high and low-level construals as: 
High-level construals are relatively simple, decontextualized representations that 
extract the gist from the available information. These construals consist of 
general, superordinate, and essential features of events. A defining characteristic 
of high-construal features is that changes in these features produce major changes 
in the meaning of the event. Low-level construals tend to be more concrete and 
include subordinate, contextual, and incidental features of events. Changes in 
these features produce relatively minor changes in the meaning of the event. Low-
level construals are thus richer and more detailed but less structured and 
parsimonious than high-level construals (2003: 405) 
As psychological distance increases, those aspects of information aligned with high-level 
construals become more valuable, and as psychological distance decreases, aspects 
aligned with lower-level construals become more relevant (Trope & Liberman, 2003, 
2010). While CLT often discusses two (high and low) levels of construal, abstraction is 
conceived to exist at a variety of levels across a continuum (Trope & Liberman, 2010).  
 Construal Level Theory and the concept of psychological distance grew out of a 
line of research on construal level and temporal distance that showed that temporal 
perspectives (often manipulated from tomorrow to one year from now) influenced: how 
people prioritized information (Liberman, Sagristano, & Trope, 2002, Study 1), made 
choices based on primary or secondary goals (Liberman & Trope, 1998; Trope & 
Liberman, 2000), considered information complexity in decision making (Liberman et 
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al., 2002 Study 2), and valued feasibility versus desirability in making choices (Liberman 
& Trope, 1998). As the broader concept of psychological distance became more 
prominent, further studies showed that spatial distance (Henderson, Fujita, Trope, & 
Liberman, 2006), social distance (Liviatan, Trope, & Liberman, 2008), and 
hypotheticality (Torodov, Goren, & Trope, 2007) also influenced the level of abstraction 
used to evaluate choices and make decisions.  
Psychological distance has been related to creativity in studies using different 
dimensions of distance. Förster, Friedman, and Liberman (2004) found that increasing 
temporal distance facilitates solution attainment on insight problems and creative idea 
generation through higher levels of abstract thinking. Both creative idea generation and 
creative insight in problem solving was shown to benefit from increased spatial distance 
in experiments reported by Jai, Hirt, and Karpen (2009). Findings that social distance 
increased creative generation and that this relationship was mediated by general 
perceptions of psychological distance were reported by Polman and Emich (2011).  
Theoretically, creativity and idea generation has historically been associated with 
divergent thinking (e.g. Guilford, 1950; Osborn, 1953; Runco, 1984: Shalley & Gilson, 
2004) and the broadening of perceptions that is engendered by abstract thinking. 
However, how this relationship works through the individual dimensions is not yet clear. 
With respect to the dimensions of novelty and usefulness, CLT makes several 
predictions. Psychological distance influences the primacy of desirability or feasibility 
concerns in decision making choices. Feasibility has often been cited as a factor in 
determining the usefulness of an idea or product (e.g. Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Reitzschel 
et al., 2010). It has been shown that increasing temporal distance (Liberman & Trope, 
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1998), social distance (Liviatan et al., 2008), and hypotheticality (Torodov et al., 2007) 
decrease the importance of feasibility in choice behavior. Conceptually, lower levels of 
construal allow for fine details to be more in focus, this finer grained information allows 
a less uncertainty in considering the feasibility of a proposed solution. In situations, such 
as when solving a business problem, where feasibility may be highly related to the 
usefulness of an idea within context, it would stand to reason that as concerns about 
feasibility decrease with greater psychological distance, concerns about usefulness would 
also decrease. As an attentional focus is brought to concerns about usefulness, bounded 
rationality (Simon, 1957) and decision making heuristics (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 
2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) would propose that this factor would receive greater 
weighting in complex decision processes. Thus, I propose that increasing psychological 
distance will decrease the salience of usefulness evaluations in making creativity 
judgments.  
Hypothesis 1: The relationship of usefulness evaluations to overall 
judgments of creativity will weaken as psychological distance increases. 
Novelty has been considered within CLT in that ―novel events are unfamiliar and 
often (but not always) subjectively improbable‖ (Trope & Liberman, 2010: 457). 
Conceptually, higher levels of construal focus ones attention on broader categories of 
information, allowing one to bring in more flexibility and fluency to ones thought 
process. This activation of opening up the minds focus to diverse input should activate a 
higher appreciation for novelty. In several experiments, participants construed actions 
and products more abstractly when these were framed as more novel versus more familiar 
occurrences (Förster, Liberman, & Shapira, 2009). Another set of experiments has shown 
that exposure to novel (as compared to familiar stimuli) prompted participants to process 
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information at a higher level of construal in preferring choices based on global 
characteristics versus more fine grained details (Förster, 2009). Wiekens and Stapel 
(2008) have shown that manipulations of social distance can increase the novelty of 
responses in naming objects within a range of categories. This pattern of results led Trope 
and Liberman (2010) to call for future research to examine the relationship between 
construal level, novelty, and creativity. 
If judgments of creativity are based on a weighted combination of evaluations of 
an idea‘s novelty and usefulness, it appears that psychological distance may prime the 
salience of one dimension at the expense of the other. This is in line with the findings of 
Bar-Anan, Liberman, Trope, and Algom (2007), that showed participants focused on 
information that was congruent with their primed level of psychological distance and 
ignored cues congruent with another level of psychological distance. This evidence and 
the rationale behind many decision making perspectives (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974; Tversky et al., 1988) would predict that as psychological distance increases, the 
level at which information is processed or construed also grows more abstract; this 
tendency will make information about novelty more salient and thus more influential in 
making judgments of creativity. Considering this I propose that increasing psychological 
distance will increase the salience of novelty evaluations in making creativity judgments. 
Hypothesis 2: The relationship of novelty evaluations to overall judgments 
of creativity will strengthen as psychological distance increases. 
 I look to test these hypotheses across three studies. The first is a situated 
experiment using an intact organization working on issue of significance to their daily 
work and testing general psychological distance frames. The second and third studies are 
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laboratory experiments using sub-dimensions of time and social distance in framing the 
tasks. 
  
  
 
 
VI.  STUDY 1 
 
 This first study was undertaken in the field using a situated experiment 
(Greenberg & Tomlinson, 2004) to explore the general effects of psychological distance 
on weighing novelty and usefulness in making judgments of creativity. Wanting to 
maximize experimental control but conduct this research in a more natural environment, I 
chose to approach this Study 1 as a situated experiment. Employees were randomly 
selected into conditions and presented with carefully crafted manipulations, but the ideas 
they were evaluating were actual suggestions put forward to address a real organizational 
need. Thus this experiment blended the artificial control of an experiment with the natural 
content and work process of the organization to explore how employees made creativity 
judgments within their own work context. This study was conducted using an internet 
based survey within a large multinational staffing firm‘s southeastern regional division. 
Using three conditions of control, low psychological distance, and high psychological 
distance, this study is used to test Hypothesis 1 and 2.  
Sample 
 Working closely with the senior vice-president and the communication director 
for the region, I developed core materials that would be relevant to the region‘s 
employees and leadership team. With the potential for gaining feedback and 
improvement ideas on considered innovations this research project was seen as a 
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potential benefit for the company as well as the researcher and thus no external incentives 
were necessary to encourage participation in this study. The senior vice president of the 
region sent out an email encouraging participation in this university based innovation 
study to all 485 employees of the region. Responses came from all major job roles within 
the region, including sales (47.9%), recruiters (36.9%), field support personnel (8.3%) 
and corporate support (1.4%), with the remaining (4.6%) indicating another job category. 
Respondents were typically male (67.4%), white (88.4%), single (53.0%) and younger 
(M=29.6 years old), with employees ranging in age from 23 to 45 years of age. All 
employees indicated some college education, with the majority holding a Bachelors 
Degree (88.4%) and several with a Masters (3.7%).  
 In total, the survey was initiated 261 times and completed by 212 employees 
(43.7% response rate). This drop-out rate (18.7% attempts were never completed) was 
expected due to the dynamic nature of a sales based workforce‘s schedule, where tasks 
are often interrupted by urgent calls. Because the study was anonymous, several of these 
drop-outs may have completed the survey from the beginning at another time. Thus to be 
conservative analyses have only been run on those completing the entire survey. This 
situated experiment using corporate communication channel regularly utilized for 
soliciting feedback and employee input, received surveys from almost half the employees 
based in the region. While this is not full participation and there may be some sampling 
bias (Rogelberg & Stanton, 2007), this sampling bias is a naturally occurring byproduct 
of soliciting voluntary feedback in the workplace. Voice or speaking up within an 
organization is a voluntary activity, yet it is only that input actually contributed that are 
then available to the broader organization (Rank, Pace, & Frese, 2004; Van Dyne, Ang, 
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& Botero, 2004). Thus only considering the respondents who voluntarily responded we 
are more closely mimicking real world organizational situations. The respondents to the 
situated experiment can then be considered a realistic population whom provide normal 
feedback to the region‘s leadership as a natural course.  
Study Design 
 This study was designed to request employees to evaluate four creative ideas 
developed to help improve a particular aspect of their business. To ensure that this task 
had a natural realism to the employees and the organization, I worked with the region‘s 
leadership team to develop ideas around a new company wide initiative to improve 
―pricing and durations‖ of client contracts. Working with this group, I requested that they 
develop several creative (both new and useful) ways that they could improve these 
aspects of client contracts. This group developed a number of potential innovative 
solutions to these issues and in discussion with the region‘s senior vice-president selected 
four that would be put forward to the entire region. Using these four internally developed 
ideas as the basis for the study was intended to provide some internal validity in that all 
ideas were pertinent to the core functions of the entire organization. These ideas are listed 
below: 
Idea: The idea is – NO FREE CONVERSIONS – the current state is that we do 
not typically charge a buyout fee if the contractor meets their contract to hire 
period of time.  However, during client negotiations we may decrease our 
duration terms to win the business.  In this case and others like it, we should be 
charging a conversion fee at the end of this contract period.  So the idea is that 
every contract that is lower than the standard we have for each division, there will 
be a buyout fee added to the contract agreement.  This will result in additional 
revenue gained for (Company Name) at the end of this contract and before the 
contractor goes direct. 
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Idea: Recruiter salary negotiations training – As of now there is no robust training 
program for teaching our recruiters how to negotiate.  I feel that if we conducted a 
negotiation training session in the region we could gain margins.  Sales people 
can increase margins through bill rate and mark up negotiations and recruiters can 
increase margins if negotiations are handled properly.  By making this a focal 
point we could increase margins on just about every deal. 
 
Idea: Focus on Contract placements making 25%+ of first year salary – for direct 
hires we make 25% of the candidates first year salary, yet sometimes we negotiate 
deals on a contract or contract to hire basis where we make less gross profit than 
25% of their first year salary.  For a contract or contract to hire scenario, we 
should exceed 25% of first year salary and here is why – it takes just as long to 
find the candidate and during a contract we absorb the burdens of employment; ie 
workers compensation, unemployment, benefits, and contractor maintenance.  If 
we taught every sales person to how to exceed 25% of their candidate‘s first year 
salary we would increase our spread per contractor and ultimately increase our 
margins. 
 
Idea: Increase durations by 1 week for every assignment moving forward – 
starting April 1st every new negotiation (new client) we would try to get one more 
week for the duration of the contract.  So if we would normally negotiate a new 
deal at 26 weeks, let‘s go over 27 weeks instead.  If we did this as a region, we 
would see an increase in spread over the long term.  Essentially, if we added one 
week to every assignment we would see our gross profits increase and ultimately 
our regions spread would reflect this change. 
 
Employees were sent a link to the survey asking them to evaluate several potential 
new approaches to how client deals might be structured to improve profit margins and 
then complete a survey focused on their feelings and views of innovation. Employees 
were automatically placed at random into one of three conditions that framed the task at 
hand into one of three primed conditions: Control, Low Psychological Distance and High 
Psychological Distance.  
 Employees were then presented with four ideas and asked to evaluate them one at 
a time on creativity, novelty, usefulness, and the extent to which the individual felt 
competent to rate each idea. After rating the four ideas, participants were asked to 
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complete a short survey which included manipulation checks, measures of intrinsic 
motivation for doing this task, creative efficacy, and some demographic information.   
Manipulations 
 In an effort to maximize the strength of the psychological distance prime, efforts 
were made to consider all of the dimensions of psychological distance within the priming 
text. The control condition includes the basic instructions for the assignment with effort 
made to minimize distance considerations in the text drawn from manipulations of these 
factors from previous research (for reviews see, Bar-Anan et al., 2006; Trope & 
Liberman, 2010). In the psychological distance conditions, where the ideas came from 
was altered to manipulate both social, as similar to self versus different other focused 
(Liviatan et al., 2008, Polman & Emich, 2011) and spatial, as either near or far locations 
(Jia et al., 2009) distance. In attempting to reduce psychological distance, the low 
condition positioned the ideas to be considered as having been developed by fellow 
―Southeast Region employees‖, while in the more distant condition the ideas originated 
from ―external consultants‖ from Canada. Temporal distance was manipulated as in 
previous studies (Förster et al., 2004; Liberman et al., 2002) with requests to consider 
how these ideas would improve business ―in the near future‖ (Low) or ―over the next few 
years‖ (High). Hypotheticality differed in the potential consideration for use by the 
participant region varying certainty of outcome (Todorov et al., 2007), as the ideas ―are 
being considered‖ (Low) or ―some might be considered‖ (High) by the region‘s 
leadership.  The full text of each of these conditions is list below. 
Control: Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. (Company name) has 
agreed to encourage participation in this survey to learn more about how new 
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ideas are evaluated throughout the Southeast region. All of these ideas were 
generated to improve Pricing and Durations. Your input will help us to learn 
more about how the organization as a whole considers creative ideas. In 
participating in this study, you will be asked to evaluate four ideas developed 
for this study and then complete a short survey.  
Low Psychological Distance: Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. 
(Company name) has agreed to encourage participation in this survey to learn 
more about how new ideas are evaluated throughout the Southeast region. You 
will be asked to evaluate several ideas generated by other employees.   A focal 
group of Southeast Region employees worked to generate suggestions as to how 
to improve business in the near future. This focal group was asked to generate 
ideas to improve Pricing and Durations. Many ideas were suggested and are 
being considered by your southeast region‘s senior leadership team. Your input 
is needed to learn more about how the organization as a whole considers 
creative ideas. In participating in this study, you will be asked to evaluate four 
ideas developed for this study and then complete a short survey.  
High Psychological Distance: Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. 
(Company name) has agreed to encourage participation in this survey to learn 
more about how new ideas are evaluated throughout the Southeast region. You 
will be asked to evaluate several ideas recommended by Canadian consultants. 
We received a number of suggested ideas that had been developed for the 
Canada Region by a group of external consultants looking to improve their 
business over the next few years. This focal group was asked to generate ideas 
to improve Pricing and Durations. Many ideas were suggested and some might 
be considered by the senior leadership team. Your input is needed help evaluate 
these ideas and to learn more about how the organization as a whole considers 
creative ideas. In participating in this study, you will be asked to evaluate four 
ideas developed for this study and then complete a short survey. 
Measures 
 This entire survey was completed individually and all measures unless otherwise 
noted were measured on a 7-point Likert scale. 
Focal Variables: The creativity, usefulness, and novelty of each idea was 
measured using a scale based on common adjectives used by psychologists to capture 
these concepts. Items for each scale were developed based on synonyms often used 
interchangeably in creativity research for the focal constructs (Amabile, 1996; Cropley, 
2000; Guilford, 1950; Kampylis & Valtanen, 2010; Plucker et al., 2004). The items used 
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to measure the perceived creativity of the ideas were, “Overall, how creative is this 
idea?”, “How inventive is this idea?”, and “To what extent is this idea innovative?” 
(α=.94). Items used to capture the perceived Usefulness of each idea were, ―How useful is 
this idea?”, “To what extent might this idea be helpful?”, and ―How valuable might this 
idea be?” (α=.93). The items used to capture the perceived Novelty of the ideas were, 
―How unique is this idea?”, “How original is this idea?”, and ―To what extent does this 
idea stand out as different?” (α=.93).  All items for these constructs were rated on scales 
anchored by 1= Not at All and 7= Extremely So to capture the perceived extent each idea 
possessed these qualities.  
Control Variables: As the componential model of creativity (Amabile, 1996) puts 
forward three (Motivation, Creativity Skills, and Expertise) necessary components 
required for creativity generation, I wanted to control for these related components in this 
study as these may have some effect on evalution. Even with random assignment 
controlling distribution of these factors among conditions, I find significant variance on 
these factors across individuals within manipulated conditions. Thus, controlling for 
natural variance between individuals will help make a stronger case for the moderating 
effect of psychological distance 
 Most contextual studies have relied on intrinsic motivation as the explanatory 
factor for influencing creativity (for a review see, Shalley et al., 2004). With this in mind 
I measured Intrinsic Motivation focused on two targets, the first being intrinsic 
motivation for being creative as well as the intrinsic motivation for completing the 
evaluation task in this experiment. General intrinsic motivation was measured on a scale 
adapted from Tierney, Farmer, & Graen (1999) with three items evaluated on a scale 
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anchored with 1=Disagree Strongly to 7= Agree Strongly. The items in this scale were, “I 
enjoy finding solutions to complex problems”, “I enjoy coming up with new ideas for 
products or procedures”, and “I enjoy improving existing processes or products” 
(α=.88).   Intrinsic motivation focused on the recent task of evaluating ideas was 
introduced with a statement: ―What is your level of enjoyment/ interest in considering 
new ideas? For each of the following statements, please indicate how true it is for you, 
using the following scale‖ and anchored with 1=Very Untrue to 7= Very True. These 
items were adapted from a scale created by Ryan (1982) to capture the interest and 
enjoyment of a particular activity. The items used to capture intrinsic motivation through 
interest and enjoyment of the activity itself were, “This activity was fun to do” , “This 
activity did not hold my attention at all”, “I would describe this activity as very 
interesting”, and “I thought this activity was quite enjoyable” (α=.86).   
   As a self perception of one‘s creativity skills, I measured creative self efficacy 
using two items from Tierney & Farmer (2002). These items were, “I have confidence in 
my ability to solve problems creatively” and “I feel that I am good at generating novel 
ideas” (α=.71). These items were rated on a scale anchored at 1= Disagree Strongly to 7= 
Agree Strongly. These questions are used to broadly assess an individual‘s belief that they 
have creative capabilities and thus should serve as a self-report estimate of general 
creativity skills. 
 Expertise or domain knowledge was assessed for each individual by averaging 
how competent they felt in rating each of the ideas. Individuals indicated their 
competence with these ideas in responding to a question, “How competent did you feel to 
rate the creativity of this idea” on a scale of 1= Not at All to 7 = Extremely So. While 
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these measures were at the idea level, I was more interested in general levels of expertise 
within the broader domain and thus these idea ratings were aggregated to comprise an 
average expertise rating within the domain.  
Manipulation Check: To determine whether the experimental manipulation of 
psychological distance worked as intended, at the end of the survey participants rated 
their feelings of distance on four items.  To assess an individual‘s general level of 
psychological distance from this task, questions were focused on distance from the ideas, 
parties involved, and the task overall (Liviatan et al., 2008; Polman & Emich, 2011).  
These four items were, “How closely did these ideas relate to your organization?”, 
“When considering these ideas, how relevant were these ideas to your organization?”, 
“When considering these ideas, how closely did those who developed these ideas 
understand your business?”, and “How closely connected did you feel to this task when 
evaluating these ideas?” (α=.89).  These items were rated on a scale anchored at 1= Very 
Distant to 7= Very Close. Testing the manipulation check across the three conditions 
Control, Low and High as shown in Table 2, indicated a significant mean difference 
between Low and High (p< .01) and Control and High (p< .001) but no significant 
difference between the Control and the Low Distance condition (p=  ns). As no 
information was provided as to psychological distance in the control prime, it may be that 
employees felt close to the process naturally because the request had come from the 
region‘s senior vice-president and with no other information to influence distance that 
relation may have been enough to make them feel closer to the task than in the conditions 
where psychological distance was set, however this is not for sure so results will be 
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reported for the two manipulated conditions as the difference between them can be 
assumed to be based on the manipulation. 
 
Table 2: Study 1 – Mean Differences in Psychological Distance as captured by the 
Manipulation Check 
Condition N Mean SD Sig.(Tukey HSD) 
Control 68 6.00 .87 Control – Low  p = .826 
Low Distance 76 5.90 .99 Low – High  p= .003 
High Distance 73 5.37 1.03 High – Control p< .000 
 
Results 
 Table 3 provides the means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations of the 
variables at the individual level across all three conditions. In order to present 
correlations at the same level of analysis, some of the variables that had been captured for 
multiple ideas for each individual were aggregated to the individual level (Hofmann, Lei, 
& Grant, 2009). Ratings of creativity, usefulness, novelty, and expertise were captured 
for each idea rating (N = 848) by each individual (N =212). To analyze these data with 
ratings of ideas nested within the individual I needed to take a multilevel approach to 
account for this nesting of the data.  This was accomplished by using a random 
coefficient model to test for psychological distance moderating the relationships of 
novelty and usefulness to creativity (i.e., Deadrick, Bennett, & Russell, 1997; Hofmann, 
1997). 
 I conducted a confirmatory factor analysis to examine whether the creativity, 
usefulness, and novelty items loaded onto different scales using the full data set (patterns 
were confirmed with separate CFAs on single item responses). The predicted three-factor 
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solution indicated excellent fit with this data, χ2(24) = 145.00, CFI = .99, SMRM = .02. All 
factor loading were statistically significant and ranged from .87 to .94 for creativity, .83 
to .94 for usefulness, and .85 to .92 for novelty. I compared this three factor model with 
alternative nested models. The model fit indices for creativity and novelty loading on the 
same factor were χ2(26) = 992.72, CFI = .95, SMRM = .04, for creativity and usefulness 
on the same factor were χ2(26) = 1917.33, CFI = .88, SMRM = .10, for novelty and 
usefulness on the same factors were χ2(26) = 3875.43, CFI = .83, SMRM = .17, and for the 
one factor-solution were χ2(27) = 2761.37, CFI = .84, SMRM = .11. A chi-square 
difference test indicated that the three-factor model showed superior fit to all of these 
alternative models. While novelty and creativity are highly correlated with a 
dissattenuated correlation of .90, the three factor model showed better fit for the data than 
loading these six items on one factor (∆χ2(2) = 847.72, p < .001). Also theoretically, as 
one factor, novelty, is a dimension of the other, creativity, one should expect these 
measures would be highly correlated. 
Table 3: Study 1 - Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations of All Variables 
Included in the Study at the Individual Level 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Creativity 4.63 0.95 (.94) 
       
2. Usefulness 5.19 0.79 .67
**
 (.93) 
      
3. Novelty 4.35 1.01 .88
**
 .53
**
 (.93) 
     
4. Intrinsic Motivation 
for Creativity 
6.06 0.85 .14
*
 .15
*
 .12 (.88) 
    
5. Intrinsic Motivation 
for Task 
4.33 1.12 .22
**
 .31
**
 .21
**
 .16
*
 (.86) 
   
6. Creative Skills 5.91 0.78 .16
*
 .18
*
 .14
*
 .56
**
 .21
**
 (.71) 
  
7. Domain Expertise 5.05 0.99 .32
**
 .43
**
 .32
**
 .16
*
 .27
**
 .23
**
 - 
 
8. Psychological 
Distance 
5.74 1.01 .23
**
 .37
**
 .17
*
 .12 .25
**
 .08 .36
**
 (.89) 
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Note: N= 212. Correlations are all presented at the individual level of analysis. As each individual provided 
multiple ratings for creativity, usefulness, novelty, and expertise; these were aggregated at the individual 
level. *p<  .05. **p<  .01. 
 In exploring the relationship of novelty and usefulness to creativity as well as 
testing the moderating influence attributed to psychological distance, I wanted to explore 
the variance attributed at each step. To do this I ran three models, a base model (Model 1) 
with no predictors from which to begin to estimate the explained variance of subsequent 
models. The next model (Model 2) included both Novelty and Usefulness at Level 1. A 
third model (Model 3) including the two measures of intrinsic motivation, the measures 
of self-perceived creativity skills as well as domain expertise, and finally the manipulated 
condition (Low and High psychological distance) with individual ratings of ideas at Level 
1 and individual differences at Level 2 in a model similar to that described by Deadrick 
and associates (1997) for considering individuals at Level 2. This analysis begins with a 
base model including only the dependent variable at Level 1 to partition the total variance 
explained at the idea and individual levels. Using the estimated variance components at 
the idea level (r = 1.395) and at the individual level (u0 = .538, p < .001) of the base 
model, the variance in the dependent variable attributable to each level can be computed. 
Using the variance components from Model 1, the proportion of variance that can be 
explained at the individual Level 2 is 27.9% with the remaining 72.1% of variance 
attributed to ideas at Level 1. Thus, this analysis continues with modeling the Level 1 
predictors alone in Table 4 to determine if significant residual variance exists at Level 2 
to warrant exploration of individual direct effects and moderating factors, the equations 
estimated in this Model 2 are: 
 Creativity = β0j + β1jNovelty + β2jUsefulness + r 
 β00 = γ00 + u0 
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β10 = γ10 + u1 
β20 = γ20 + u2 
 
Table 4: Study 1 - Results Hierarchical Linear Modeling Results for Level 1 Main Effects 
with no Level 2 predictors 
Fixed Effects Coefficient 
Standard 
Error t-ratio p 
Intercept, β0j 4.624 .031 149.69 < .001 
Usefulness, β1j  .325 .031 10.65 < .001 
Novelty, β2j  .595 .028 20.56 < .001 
Note: N=146 for the fixed effects calculations using only low and high conditions. Additional variance 
explained was computed over the Null model to be R
2
 = .83. Variance components for the null model were: 
Level 1 residual = 1.395 and individual = .538. 
 
With significant variance indicated at Level 2 for both usefulness and novelty, the 
next stage of analysis is warranted. Model 2 provides an estimate of the mean creativity 
intercept as well as test of the estimated unstandardized slopes for both usefulness and 
novelty. The estimated mean creativity intercept was 4.624, indicating a moderate level 
of assessed creativity based on a 7 point scale. Both slopes for usefulness (β = .325, p < 
.001) and novelty (β = .595, p < .001) were significant indicating both components were 
influential in predicting ratings of creativity. Using an Level 1 residuals from Model 1 
and Model 2, an estimate of the explained variance accounted for by including these two 
predictors can be computed using an ratio of ( rModel1 – rModel2)/ rModel1. This ratio indicated 
that the addition of usefulness and novelty together accounted for 83% of the Level 1 
variance in ratings of creativity. A supplementary consideration including the interaction 
of novelty and usefulness at Level 1 showed this predictor to be non-significant (t = -
.675, p = .501) beyond the independent effects of novelty and usefulness and thus this 
interaction term was not considered in these analysis. When considering factors at Level 
2, Model 3 is constructed as such: 
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Creativity = β0j + β1jNovelty + β2jUsefulness + r 
 β00 = γ00 + γ01IM_C + γ02IM_A + γ03CS + γ04DE + γ05PDCond + u0 
β10 = γ10 + γ11IM_C + γ12IM_A + γ13CS + γ14DE + γ15PDCond + u1 
β20 = γ20 + γ21IM_C + γ22IM_A + γ23CS + γ24DE + γ25PDCond + u2 
 
Table 5: Study 1 - Results Hierarchical Linear Modeling Results for Level 2 Effects 
Creativity Direct Effects 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-ratio p 
Intercept, γ00 4.625 .029 157.49 < .001 
Intrinsic Motivation Creativity, γ01 -.012 .041 -.28 .778 
Intrinsic Motivation Act, γ02 .015 .028 .54 .589 
Creativity Skills, γ03 .053 .050 1.07 .288 
Domain Expertise, γ04 -.017 .031 -.54 .590 
Psychological Distance Condition, γ05 -.173 .060 -2.88 .005 
Usefulness Slope Effects     
Intercept, γ10 .331 .029 11.50 < .001 
Intrinsic Motivation Creativity, γ11 .022 .039 .56 .576 
Intrinsic Motivation Act, γ12 .021 .030 .70 .486 
Creativity Skills, γ13 .023 .044 .52 .606 
Domain Expertise, γ14 -.071 .036 -1.94 .054 
Psychological Distance Condition, γ15 -.121 .062 -1.97 .051 
Novelty Slope Effects     
Intercept, γ20 .590 .027 22.24 < .001 
Intrinsic Motivation Creativity, γ21 .024 .034 .71 .478 
Intrinsic Motivation Act, γ22 -.003 .023 -.14 .888 
Creativity Skills, γ23 -.113 .043 -2.65 .009 
Domain Expertise, γ24 .063 .029 2.17 .032 
Psychological Distance Condition, γ25 .119 .059 2.02 .045 
Note: Sample size was 583 at Level 1 and 146 at Level 2. 
 Level 2 effects shown in Table 5 estimate the influence of individual factors on 
the rating of an idea‘s creativity. The significance of these coefficients provides tests of 
both direct and moderating effects of individual factors, a significant coefficient estimate 
in predicting either usefulness slope or novelty slope would be direct evidence of 
moderation (Hofmann, 1997). In Hypothesis 1, I predicted that an individual‘s 
psychological distance would moderate the relationship between usefulness and creativity 
judgments. The coefficient estimate for the psychological distance manipulation (γ15 = -
.121, p≤ .05) was significant and negative as predicted in Hypothesis 1. This result 
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indicates support for moderation, such that at higher levels of psychological distance the 
relationship between usefulness and creativity weakens.   
 Hypothesis 2 was supported in this study as indicated by a significant coefficient 
estimate for the psychological distance manipulation (γ15 = .119, p≤ .05). This provides 
evidence for Hypothesis 2, which states that psychological distance will strengthen the 
relationship between novelty and creativity. Even when controlling for factors previously 
considered necessary components (Amabile, 1996) for creativity these effects are 
evidenced, showing strong support for this moderation effect. 
 It is interesting to note that psychological distance also shows a significant direct 
effect on ratings of creativity (γ05 = -.173, p= .005). This result appears to indicate that at 
higher levels of psychological distance ratings of creativity may be slightly depressed 
overall and was not hypothesized. However, a greater focus on novelty in considering 
creativity may have contributed to this negative influence as the average novelty rating is 
lower than the average usefulness rating. It should also be noted that measured domain 
expertise was a significant moderator of both usefulness and novelty relationships with 
creativity, in the same direction as psychological distance. Additionally, self-evaluated 
creativity skills appear to weaken the relationship between novelty and creativity, without 
any significant effect on the relationship of usefulness and creativity. These effects were 
not initially hypothesized but support a broader contention that the weighting of novelty 
and usefulness vary in their relation to ratings of creativity. 
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Table 6: Study 1 - Variance explained in Creativity Intercept, Usefulness and Novelty 
Slopes between Models 2 and 3 
Model 
Creativity 
Intercept (u0) 
Usefulness 
Slope (u1) 
Novelty 
Slope (u2) 
Model 2, No level 2 predictors  .056 .044 .041 
Model 2, Including level 2 predictors  .054 .040 .036 
Percent Variance Explained  3.6% 9.1% 12.2% 
Note: Sample size was 583 at Level 1 and 146 at Level 2. 
 Support for Hypothesis 1 is strengthened by a good percentage of variance 
explained by our Level 2 predictors, as shown in Table 6, accounting for 9.1% of the 
variance in the slope for usefulness in predicting creativity. Support for Hypothesis 2 is 
also bolstered by a high percentage of variance explained by our Level 2 predictors which 
accounted for 12.2% of the variance in the slope of novelty in predicting creativity. The 
direct effects of the individual factors accounted for 3.6% of the variance in the creativity 
intercept. Figure 4 shows the moderation effect of psychological distance has on the 
relationship between usefulness and creativity, while Figure 5 does the same for the 
relationship between novelty and creativity. The test for moderation using multilevel 
modeling showed significant moderation of both relationships novelty and usefulness to 
overall creativity, however the effect size is harder to interpret from the preceding 
analysis. Using a fixed effects model of OLS regression, an unbiased assessment of the 
effect size can be determined (Hofmann, Morgeson, & Gerras, 2003), this approach 
indicted that the interaction of psychological distance with the dimensions of novelty and 
usefulness were both significant and accounted for an additional 1% (R
2
 change = .01) of 
variance beyond the simple main effects in predicting creativity. Interaction effects are 
often difficult to detect and within social science research typically account for between 
1-3% of variance explained and should be considered important at these levels 
(McClelland & Judd, 1993).  
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Figure 4: Study 1 - Relationship of Usefulness and Creativity Moderated by 
Psychological Distance 
 
 
Figure 5: Study 1 - Relationship of Novelty and Creativity Moderated by Psychological 
Distance 
 
Discussion 
 This study provides initial support for a moderating effect on how individuals 
weight components of creativity in making judgments. This study finds that 
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psychological distance in fact can moderate the relationships of usefulness and novelty to 
judgments of overall creativity. In finding support for the use of psychological distance 
framing in altering how novelty and usefulness contribute to creativity judgments, this 
study provides evidence that the assumption of stability on considering the dimensions of 
creativity may be flawed.  
While psychological distance evidenced a significant moderating effect on the 
salience of both novelty and usefulness, these effects were rather small. There are many 
reasons for difficulty in finding moderation in the field (McClelland & Judd, 1993). In 
this case range restriction of the focal moderating variable may have been an issue and 
weaken the statistical power of the analysis. Supplemental analysis of additional items 
captured in the demographic survey at the request of the company indicated a strong level 
of affective commitment to the company (scale M = 5.92, SD = .10) as indicated on items 
adapted from Allen and Meyer (1990). This high level of affective commitment to the 
organization may help create a naturally low sense of psychological distance in 
considering organizational issues. This may have been compounded by having the survey 
sent out by the region‘s senior vice-president. An indication of this may be found in the 
fact that the manipulation check for psychological distance did not find statistical 
difference between the control or low distance conditions. A high level of connection to 
the organization may have hampered the distancing prime from having a stronger effect. 
While the low and high psychological distance conditions were significantly different 
(MHigh = 5.37, MLow = 5.90, scale 1=Very Distant to 7 = Very Close), they both fell 
between anchors of Somewhat Close and Close. This range restriction is a potential 
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limitation for the generalizability of these findings to broader levels of psychological 
distance. 
This study combines several different dimension of psychological distance into 
one manipulation. Thus there is no way to parcel out the effects of the individual 
dimensions of psychological distance on these relationships. Replicating the findings of 
this study in the lab manipulating the individual components of psychological distance, 
could help extend these findings and provide constructive replication of the findings from 
Study 1. Study 2 and Study 3 will test temporal and social distance framings on how 
novelty and usefulness contribute to judgments of creativity using the same task but 
different distance framings. 
  
  
 
 
VII.  STUDY 2 
 
In an effort to corroborate the findings of Study 1, Study 2 will consider the 
moderating effect of temporal distance on the relationships between usefulness and 
novelty with creativity judgments. In an effort to extend the findings of Study 1, this 
study focuses on one of the dimensions of psychological distance; namely, temporal 
distance.  
Sample 
 Participants were recruited through Mechanical Turk an online marketplace for 
crowdsourcing simple work tasks. One hundred working adults began the experimental 
study through volunteering to accept the survey assignment. Eighty seven participants 
completed the entire survey and are included in this analysis. Participants who completed 
this study were mostly male (54.7%), white (71.3%), and on average, 30.3 years old 
(SD= 10.55). Additionally, participants were drawn from 32 states with all having at least 
a high school diploma and 88% having some college education. Participants indicated an 
average of 9.29 years of work experience (SD= 8.98) and reported careers in a broad 
range of fields such as software, retail, education, manufacturing, and management 
among others. 
Study Design 
  78 
This study was designed to test the effects of psychological distance through 
framing an evaluation task using temporal distance a facet of the broader construct. 
Participants were directed to a task of reviewing ideas submitted as solutions to a 
business problem, which was adapted from Grant & Berry (2011). This task asks 
participants to help evaluate four ideas previously generated to help a band identify 
promising ways to increase revenue and build exposure. Before having participants 
formally evaluate the four selected ideas, they were asked to review a sample of twenty-
five ideas generated for this problem. Amabile (1996) recommends that judges of 
creative ideas should have some training or be at least familiar with the domain in which 
they are rating ideas. Participants in this study are expressing their own personal 
judgments and not claiming any special expertise. However, as creativity is to be 
considered within context and is necessary a relative judgment, allowing participants to 
review a sample of generated suggestions will provide them with a point of reference 
from which to make a comparative judgment as suggested in Amabile‘s Consensual 
Assessment Technique (1996) as well as common practice for priming raters in policy 
capturing methodologies (Karren & Barringer, 2002). The general task statement and 
initial sample of generated ideas for review were included with a condition based framing 
statement built in between, as such (component names in italics and parenthesis were not 
included in experiment text but shown here for clarity): 
(Task statement) The Association of Independent Music Artists (AIMA), in response to 
falling CD sales of many of their members, recently hosted an online forum to solicit 
ideas to help unsigned musicians and bands find ways to make money and increase their 
exposure as they build a following. In an effort to help evaluate these ideas, I am 
crowdsourcing this task.  
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Please consider the ideas submitted as options to help musicians and bands find ways to 
make money and increase their exposure as they build a following. 
 
(Condition framing statement) 
 
(Sample of generated ideas) 
 Play more live shows 
 Seek out opportunities through radio promotions or commercials 
 Enter music festivals all over the country to broaden you fan base 
 Sell music online 
 Market autographed band merchandize or partner with a local record shop 
or music venue and hold an autograph signing event before a free show 
 Perform at local bars and clubs 
 Sell CDs for less 
 Offer to play private parties 
 Give music away for free on your band website 
 Hold a raffle contest for those who buy the CD...like Willy Wonka‘s 
Golden Ticket 
 Find volunteer students to do a marketing internship with the band to have 
someone focused   
 Offer free music and sell advertising on your band website 
 Dress up in animal suits or something else crazy, you might get free 
publicity and build interest from being different 
 Advertise through Facebook and MySpace 
 Sell band tee shirts and other gear 
 Find other bands that you like and approach them with the idea of cross 
promoting their music on your website  and yours on theirs 
 Release bootleg albums of live shows for sale 
 Paper college areas with flyers 
 Approach independent stores to sell the CDs 
 Put your songs for sale through Amazon or iTunes 
 Publicise your talents with a free snippet CD and distribute it for free 
 Video songs at a show and post on You Tube 
 Have a CD release party 
 Check people for recording devices at your shows 
 Add CD coupons to live event tickets 
 
Participants were then reminded of the focus of the activity by repeating the task 
statement and conditional framing statement. This was done to refresh the participant as 
to the nature of the upcoming task and reinforce the manipulation. Participants then 
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evaluated the same four ideas on creativity, then usefulness, and then novelty. The study 
concluded with a manipulation check and a short series of demographic questions.  
Manipulations 
 The manipulations used in this study were designed after a review of 
manipulations used in past studies of psychological distance. Manipulating dimensions of 
psychological distance through framing situational context or priming though on near or 
distant terms have induced strong differences in psychological distance in previous 
studies. Temporal distance has been primed with terms of: now, immediately, and soon 
for low distance conditions, and with terms such as: a year, a decade, and later used to 
prime high temporal distance to test construal level through speed of recognizing 
constructs presented either at high or low levels of abstraction (Bar-Anon et al., 2006) . 
Temporal framing of situations have used prompts like ―imagine yourself tomorrow (a 
year from now)‖, participating in an activity on ―an upcoming weekend (a weekend a 
year from now)‖, and meeting someone ―tomorrow (four months from now)‖ in four 
studies by Liberman and associates in an effort to evaluate the association of distance 
with construal level (2002). Manipulations of ―tomorrow‘ and ―a year from now‖ or 
―next year‖ were imbedded into paragraph long decision scenarios to manipulate 
temporal distance across two studies conducted by Liberman and Trope (1998) looking at 
distance and choices of feasibility and desirability. In a study on predicting future events, 
temporal distance was manipulated within an instruction block indicating the events 
would occur either in a near time condition (following day or weekend) or a more distant 
condition (a year later or 3 months later) across two studies that found the manipulation 
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influences the contextual basis of information search and making behavioral predictions 
of behavioral constraints (Nussbaum et al., 2003).  
 Based on this abundance of successful manipulations of the dimensions of 
psychological distance in similar populations with minimal manipulations (Prentice & 
Miller, 1992), I adapted these previous framings to this study. These framings were 
presented at the beginning of the experiment and repeated before beginning the rating 
activity to reinforce the manipulation. The two experimental framings were stated as 
such: 
Low Temporal Distance: Consider how these ideas could help musicians and 
bands improve in the near term (next few weeks). 
High Temporal Distance: Consider how these ideas could help musicians and 
bands improve in the long term (next few years). 
 The ideas that were rated were taken from a previous creativity generation 
experiment Grant & Berry (2011) that expressed the greatest range on our focal variables. 
The ideas were rated in the same order by all participants and consisted of:  
Idea 1: Have the band offer music lessons to make money and build a loyal 
following 
Idea 2: Cover a vehicle(s) completely with magnets showing the band's logo or 
cover art with band info (website, email, facebook, etc) and drive around with it. 
When parked, people could take a magnet and then can buy music or come to a 
show. 
Idea 3: Offer your music online through iTunes. 
Idea 4: Play more live shows even if they are for free. 
Measures 
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 This entire survey was completed individually and new measures were used to 
capture the focal variables. Creativity was measured by asking participants to ―Rate the 
extent to which this idea is:‖ the three items were ―Creative‖, ―Innovative‖, and 
―Inventive‖ (α = .95 across all ideas) and was rated on a 9-item Likert type scale anchored 
by ―Not at all‖ and ―Extremely‖. Usefulness was rated using the same prompt and items 
of ―Useful‖, ―Effective‖, and ―Helpful‖ (α = .94). Utilizing the same prompt and scale 
Novelty was captured by three items: ―Novelty‖, ―New‖, and ―Original‖ (α = .95). 
Manipulation Check: In order to investigate that the framings worked to 
manipulated perceived temporal distance, after rating all of the ideas, participants were 
asked ―What timeframe (close or distant) did you consider when evaluating these 
ideas?‖. This item was rated on a 7 item Likert scale anchored from 1=Very Close, with 
4=Neutral, to 7= Very Distant. As shown in Table 7, participants in the two conditions 
differed significantly (p< .05) in their responses to the manipulation check. A second 
manipulation check question was posed to capture a broader feeling of psychological 
distance by asking ―How closely connected did you feel to this task when evaluating these 
ideas?”. This manipulation check did not indicate a significantly different feeling of 
distance from the task (p= n.s.) between conditions. While this manipulation check failed 
to detect significant differences between conditions, the experimental manipulation may 
have had the intended effect and may only indicate a failure of the manipulation check 
and not the manipulation itself (Sigall & Mills, 1998). 
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Table 7: Study 2 – Mean Differences in Perceived Distance as captured by the 
Manipulation Checks  
Study Condition N Mean SD t df p 
2 Temporal 
Distance 
Low Distance 43 2.70 1.10 -2.32 85 .02 
High Distance 44 3.34 1.46    
2 General 
Distance 
Low Distance 43 3.09 1.56 .88 85 .38 
High Distance 44 2.84 1.10    
 
Results 
 Table 8 provides the means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations of the 
variables, as all variables were captured across four different ideas, this table presents 
each idea separately. These correlations lend weight to the argument that novelty may be 
the primary factor in driving overall creativity. Novelty was significantly correlated with 
creativity at between .54 and .80 across these ideas, while usefulness ranged from non-
significance -.04 to significant .50.  
Table 8: Study 2 - Means, Standard Deviations at the Idea Level 
Study Variable M SD 1 2 3 
Idea 1 1. Creativity 5.96 1.91 (.91) 
  
 2. Usefulness 5.45 2.14 .43
**
 (.91) 
 
 3. Novelty 6.45 2.17 .78
**
 .26
*
 (.94) 
Idea 2 1. Creativity 6.28 1.97 (.93) 
  
 2. Usefulness 5.57 1.97 .50
**
 (.90) 
 
 3. Novelty 6.26 2.08 .54
**
 .42
**
 (.90) 
Idea 3 1. Creativity 2.88 2.04 (.93) 
  
 2. Usefulness 7.55 1.30 -.04 (.90) 
 
 3. Novelty 2.01 1.63 .65
**
 -.19 (.89) 
Idea 4 1. Creativity 3.91 2.02 (.90) 
  
2. Usefulness 7.16 1.70 .14 (.92) 
 
3. Novelty 3.20 2.09 .61
**
 -.01 (.92) 
Note: *p<  .05. **p< .01. All ideas were rated by 87 participants. 
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A confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to examine whether the creativity, 
usefulness, and novelty items loaded onto different scales for each of these ideas. Special 
attention was paid to the relationship of novelty and creativity, for while they were found 
to be differentiating by the CFA for Study1, they were highly correlated. As shown in 
Table 9, the predicted three-factor solution indicated excellent fit with this data for all of 
the ideas. A chi-square difference test indicated that the three-factor model showed 
superior fit to all of these alternative models. 
Table 9: Study 2 – Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Each Idea 
 Variable CFI SMRM χ2 df ∆ χ2 ρ 
Idea 1 3 Factor Solution .98 .08 42.06 24 
 
 
 2 Factor (Creativity and Novelty cross loaded) .85 .13 173.25 26 131.19 <.001 
 2 Factor (Creativity and Usefulness cross 
loaded) 
.83 .17 187.91 26 145.85 
<.001 
 2 Factor (Creativity and Novelty cross loaded) .62 .29 376.54 26 334.48 <.001 
 1 Factor Solution  .69 .22 377.92 27 335.86 <.001 
Idea 2 3 Factor Solution .98 .05 37.79 24 
 
 
 2 Factor (Creativity and Novelty cross loaded) .83 .13 148.98 26 111.19 <.001 
 2 Factor (Creativity and Usefulness cross 
loaded) 
.84 .14 150.37 26 113.58 
<.001 
 2 Factor (Creativity and Novelty cross loaded) .81 .16 192.96 26 155.17 <.001 
 1 Factor Solution  .69 .17 268.42 27 230.63 <.001 
Idea 3 3 Factor Solution .96 .07 49.07 24 
 
 
 2 Factor (Creativity and Novelty cross loaded) .83 .11 159.61 26 110.54 <.001 
 2 Factor (Creativity and Usefulness cross 
loaded) 
.72 .21 208.80 26 159.73 
<.001 
 2 Factor (Creativity and Novelty cross loaded) .67 .31 282.60 26 233.53 <.001 
 1 Factor Solution  .60 .22 316.46 27 267.39 <.001 
Idea 4 3 Factor Solution .99 .04 27.66 24 
 
 
2 Factor (Creativity and Novelty cross loaded) .83 .12 131.07 26 103.41 <.001 
2 Factor (Creativity and Usefulness cross 
loaded) 
.70 .21 190.44 26 162.78 
<.001 
2 Factor (Creativity and Novelty cross loaded) .55 .32 276.45 26 248.79 <.001 
1 Factor Solution  .54 .24 303.47 27 275.81 <.001 
Note: All ideas were rated by 87 participants. All ∆ χ2 difference test were calculated against the 3 factor 
model. 
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 I will once again apply the three step procedure suggested by Hofmann (1997) as 
conducted by Deadrick et al. (1997) focusing on the two temporal distance conditions. 
This analysis begins with a base model including only the dependent variable at Level 1 
to partition the total variance explained at the idea and individual levels. Using the 
estimated variance components at the idea level (r = 5.92) and at the individual level (u0 
= .008, p > .500) of the base model, the variance in the dependent variable attributable to 
each level can be computed. Using the variance components from Model 1, the 
proportion of variance that can be explained at the individual Level 2 is 0.1% with the 
remaining 99.9% of variance attributed to ideas at Level 1. With less than .2% of residual 
variance existing at the individual Level 2 in this study, consideration of individual level 
direct effects was not warranted. These results do not support either Hypothesis 1 or 2. 
However, there is significant variance at the idea level and further consideration of how 
novelty and usefulness are weighted in these judgments of creativity might be worthy of 
consideration. These weightings are thus presented in Table 10. The equations estimated 
in this Model 2 are: 
 Creativity = β0j + β1jNovelty + β2jUsefulness + r 
 β00 = γ00 + u0 
β10 = γ10 + u1 
β20 = γ20 + u2 
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Table 10: Study 2 - Results Hierarchical Linear Modeling Results for Level 1 Main 
Effects with no Level 2 predictors 
Fixed Effects Coefficient 
Standard 
Error t-ratio p 
Intercept, β0j 4.75 .089 53.65 < .001 
Usefulness, β1j  .092 .053 1.76  .083 
Novelty, β2j  .711 .028 25.40 < .001 
Note: N=348 for the fixed effects calculations using only low and high conditions. Additional variance 
explained was computed over the Null model to be R
2
 = .73. Variance components for the null model were: 
Level 1 residual = 5.920 and individual = .009.  
 
These results show creativity judgments in this study being driven almost solely 
by evaluations of novelty (β2 =.711, p < .001) as the usefulness coefficient (β1 =.092, p = 
.083) is not significant. Using Level 1 residuals from models 1 and 2, the Level 1 
estimated variance explained by these two variables was 73.0%. 
Table 11: Study 2 – Variance Components for Level 1 Main Effects with no Level 2 
predictors 
Fixed Effects 
Variance 
Component SD 
df 
χ2 p 
Intercept, μ0 .245 .495 84 105.99 .053 
Usefulness slope, μ1  .100 .316 84 135.74 < .001 
Novelty slope, μ2  .005 .067 84 88.60 .334 
Level 1,r 1.599 1.264    
Note: Chi-square statistics were based on only 85 units that had sufficient data for computation. Fixed 
effects and variance data are based on all of the data.  
 
 The results shown in Table 11, indicate that there is significant variance in the 
slope of usefulness, and further analysis of this data in considering a moderation effect is 
warranted.   
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Table 12: Study 2 - Results Hierarchical Linear Modeling Results for Level 2 Effects 
Creativity Direct Effects 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-ratio p 
Intercept, γ00 4.750 .089 53.46 < .001 
Temporal Distance Condition, γ01 .095 .178 .53 .595 
Usefulness Slope Effects     
Intercept, γ10 .091 .052 1.75 .083 
Temporal Distance Condition, γ11 .067 .104 .64 .522 
Novelty Slope Effects     
Intercept, γ20 .710 .027 25.01 < .001 
Temporal Distance Condition, γ21 .026 .057 .45 .654 
Note: Sample size was 583 at Level 1 and 146 at Level 2. 
 Level 2 effects shown in Table 12 estimate the influence of temporal distance on 
the rating of an idea‘s creativity. The significance of these coefficients provides tests of 
both direct and moderating effects of individual factors, a significant coefficient estimate 
in predicting either usefulness slope or novelty slope would be direct evidence of 
moderation (Hofmann, 1997). These results do not support Hypothesis 1, as the 
moderation effect of temporal distance on the relationship of usefulness with creativity is 
not significant. Neither do they support Hypothesis 2, indicating a non-significant 
moderation effect on the relationship between novelty and creativity. 
Table 13: Study 2 - Variance explained in Creativity Intercept, Usefulness and Novelty 
Slopes between Models 2 and 3 
Model 
Creativity 
Intercept (u0) 
Usefulness 
Slope (u1) 
Novelty 
Slope (u2) 
Model 2, No level 2 predictors  .245 .100 .005 
Model 2, Including level 2 predictor  .254 .101 .005 
Percent Variance Explained  -3.7% -1% 0% 
Note: Sample size was 583 at Level 1 and 146 at Level 2. 
 Completing the multilevel analysis and confirming the lack of explanatory 
contributions of temporal distance in relation to Level 1 predictors through HLM. Table 
13 shows a negative additional variance explained for the creativity intercept and the 
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usefulness slope. The results show no additional variance explained for the slope of 
novelty in predicting creativity with the addition of the temporal distance condition. 
Discussion 
 This laboratory Study 2 was intended to extend the findings from the situated 
field experiment presented in Study 1. However, this study did not find support for 
psychological distance through a temporal distance framing to moderate the relationships 
between novelty and usefulness with creativity. While the manipulation check for 
temporal distance found significant differences between conditions a broader question of 
distance felt from the task was not significant. Thus perhaps these manipulations of 
temporal distance had some minor effect but with both groups answering around the 
―Somewhat close‖ anchor of 3 (Mclose = 2.70, Mdistant = 3.34) perhaps the manipulations 
was not strong enough to separate the groups meaningfully in cognitive focus. This was a 
surprise as manipulations similar to those used in this study have induced strong 
differences in temporal distance (Förester et al., 2004; Liberman et al., 2002) in previous 
research.  
 However this study does show that in some instances judgments of creativity may 
be driven almost completely by evaluations of novelty as evidenced by the results in 
Table 10. This result in itself is further evidence of a disconnect between theoretical 
conceptualizations that require both novelty and usefulness (e.g. Amabile, 1996; George, 
2007; Shalley & Zhou, 2008) and judges implicit ratings of creativity. Yet in looking at 
the correlations by idea in Table 8, it is interesting that for ideas three and four usefulness 
was not significantly correlated with creativity while for idea one and two they were. 
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There may be a threshold factor necessitating a minimum level of novelty before a idea‘s 
utility is considered in judging creativity. A further analysis using general linear 
modeling with idea as a fixed effects of this data to include an interaction term for 
novelty and usefulness did not find significance for this interaction term (β= .04, StdErr = 
.08, t =.449, p= .ns). Thus an interactional (Novelty x Usefulness) perspective is not 
supported but there does appear to be some relation between the level of novelty and the 
relationship between usefulness and creativity. Perhaps a threshold perspective ((Diehl & 
Stroebe, 1987, 1991) of creativity being considering to be present, only if both novelty 
and usefulness meet an above average threshold may be evidenced in these results. 
  
  
 
 
VIII.  STUDY 3 
 
This study was run in parallel to Study 2 in an effort to corroborate the findings of 
Study 1. Study 3 explores the moderating effect of social distance on the relationships 
between usefulness and novelty with creativity judgments. In an effort to extend the 
findings on a broad consideration of psychological distance, this study looks to 
investigate the individual effects of a particular dimension of psychological distance, 
social distance.  
Sample 
 Participants were recruited through Mechanical Turk an online marketplace for 
crowdsourcing simple work tasks. One hundred and eight working adults began the 
experimental study through volunteering to accept the survey assignment. One hundred 
participants completed the entire survey and are included in this analysis. Participants 
who completed this study were mostly male (66.0%), white (77.8%), and on average, 
29.3 years old (SD= 10.67). Additionally, participants were drawn from 31 states with all 
having at least a high school diploma and 92% having some college education. 
Participants indicated an average of 9.55 years of work experience (SD= 10.10) and 
reported careers in a broad range of fields such as government, telecommunications, 
software, hospitality, education, banking, and software among others. 
Study Design 
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This study utilized the same task and set-up as Study 2. Participants were asked to 
review a number of suggestions offered to help musicians and bands increase revenue 
and exposure and then evaluate four of them. The only difference in the set up of these 
studies was the manipulation and the manipulation checks. 
Manipulations 
 The manipulations used in this study were designed after a review of 
manipulations used in past studies of psychological distance. Manipulating dimensions of 
psychological distance through framing situational context or priming though on near or 
distant terms have induced strong differences in psychological distance in previous 
studies. Social distance has been primed with asking students to consider problems for 
themselves, close others, or distant others in studies to assess creativity of decisions 
(Polman & Emich, 2011) or similarity to self through common demographics or 
experiences for evaluating the work of others (Liviatan et al., 2008). This is not a 
complete list (for reviews see, Trope & Liberman, 2007; Trope et al., 2007) but all of 
these studies manipulations were successful and were conducted on college students. 
 Based on this abundance of successful manipulations of the dimensions of 
psychological distance in similar populations with minimal manipulations (Prentice & 
Miller, 1992), I adapted these previous framings to this study. These framings were 
presented at the beginning of the experiment and repeated before beginning the rating 
activity to reinforce the manipulation. The two experimental framings were stated as 
such: 
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Low Social Distance: Consider how these ideas as if several close friends were 
starting a band and asked for your thoughts. 
High Social Distance: Consider how these ideas as if several strangers were 
starting a band and asked for your thoughts. 
 The same ideas were presented in this study and rated in the same order by all 
participants. These ideas were:  
Idea 1: Have the band offer music lessons to make money and build a loyal 
following 
Idea 2: Cover a vehicle(s) completely with magnets showing the band's logo or 
cover art with band info (website, email, facebook, etc) and drive around with it. 
When parked, people could take a magnet and then can buy music or come to a 
show. 
Idea 3: Offer your music online through iTunes. 
Idea 4: Play more live shows even if they are for free. 
Measures 
 This Study 3 used the same measures a Study 2. The item scales across all ideas 
were found to be reliable: Creativity (α = .94), Usefulness (α = .93), and Novelty (α = 
.97).  Reliabilities for each scale on each item are reported in Table 15. 
Manipulation Check: In order to investigate that the framings worked to 
manipulated perceived temporal distance, after rating all of the ideas, participants were 
asked ―How socially related (close or distant) did you feel to the bands you may be 
helping?‖. This item was rated on a 7 item Likert scale anchored from 1=Very Close, 
with 4=Neutral, to 7= Very Distant. As shown in Table 14, participants in the two 
conditions differed significantly (p< .05) in their responses to the manipulation check. A 
second manipulation check question was posed to capture a broader feeling of 
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psychological distance by asking ―How closely connected did you feel to this task when 
evaluating these ideas?”. This manipulation check did not indicate a significantly 
different feeling of distance from the task (p= n.s.) between conditions. As temporal 
distance is one of several dimensions of psychological distance, perhaps the small change 
in temporal distance was not enough to move the broader construct. 
Table 14: Study 3 – Mean Differences in Perceived Distance as captured by the 
Manipulation Checks  
Study Condition N Mean SD t df p 
2 Social 
Distance 
Low Distance 48 3.04 1.22 -2.01 98 .047 
High Distance 52 3.56 1.34    
2 General 
Distance 
Low Distance 48 2.69 1.37 -.59 98 .557 
High Distance 52 2.85 1.32    
 
Results 
 Table 15 provides the means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations of the 
variables, as all variables were captured across four different ideas, this table presents 
each idea separately. These correlations lend weight to the argument that novelty may be 
the primary factor in driving overall creativity. Novelty was significantly correlated with 
creativity at between .40 and .80 across these ideas, while usefulness ranged from non-
significance .04 to significant .56. In only one case, Idea 1, was Usefulness more highly 
correlated to Creativity than Novelty.  
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Table 15: Study 3 - Means, Standard Deviations at the Idea Level 
Study Variable M SD 1 2 3 
Idea 1 1. Creativity 5.69 1.90 (.92) 
  
 2. Usefulness 5.42 2.13 .56
**
 (.92) 
 
 3. Novelty 6.38 1.78 .40
**
 .19
*
 (.91) 
Idea 2 1. Creativity 5.94 2.23 (.94) 
  
 2. Usefulness 5.46 2.10 .58
**
 (.94) 
 
 3. Novelty 6.37 2.34 .72
**
 .49
**
 (.96) 
Idea 3 1. Creativity 2.72 1.93 (.92) 
  
 2. Usefulness 7.08 1.73 .04 (.89) 
 
 3. Novelty 2.14 1.77 .76
**
 -.09 (.95) 
Idea 4 1. Creativity 4.24 2.04 (.91) 
  
2. Usefulness 6.72 1.81 .31
**
 (.94) 
 
3. Novelty 3.68 2.00 .65
**
 .14 (.96) 
Note: *p<  .05. **p< .01. All ideas were rated by 100 participants. 
A confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to examine whether the creativity, 
usefulness, and novelty items loaded onto different scales for each of these ideas. As 
shown in Table 16, the predicted three-factor solution indicated excellent fit with this 
data for all of the ideas. A chi-square difference test indicated that the three-factor model 
showed superior fit to all of these alternative models. 
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Table 16: Study 3 – Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Each Idea 
 Variable CFI SMRM χ2 df ∆ χ2 ρ 
Idea 1 3 Factor Solution .99 .05 35.57 24 
 
 
 2 Factor (Creativity and Novelty cross loaded) .74 .16 204.52 26 168.95 <.001 
 2 Factor (Creativity and Usefulness cross loaded) .81 .12 193.82 26 158.25 <.001 
 2 Factor (Creativity and Novelty cross loaded) .70 .22 241.31 26 205.74 <.001 
 1 Factor Solution  .56 .20 362.41 27 326.84 <.001 
Idea 2 3 Factor Solution 1.00 .02 24.35 24 
 
 
 2 Factor (Creativity and Novelty cross loaded) .89 .11 216.61 26 192.26 <.001 
 2 Factor (Creativity and Usefulness cross loaded) .87 .12 204.54 26 180.19 <.001 
 2 Factor (Creativity and Novelty cross loaded) .76 .18 394.52 26 370.17 <.001 
 1 Factor Solution  .74 .18 437.87 27 413.52 <.001 
Idea 3 3 Factor Solution 1.00 .03 16.51 24 
 
 
 2 Factor (Creativity and Novelty cross loaded) .90 .09 139.73 26 123.22 <.001 
 2 Factor (Creativity and Usefulness cross loaded) .82 .20 184.53 26 168.02 <.001 
 2 Factor (Creativity and Novelty cross loaded) .54 .37 386.04 26 369.53 <.001 
 1 Factor Solution  .71 .21 307.75 27 291.24 <.001 
Idea 4 3 Factor Solution .99 .04 31.38 24 
 
 
2 Factor (Creativity and Novelty cross loaded) .86 .12 175.86 26 144.48 <.001 
2 Factor (Creativity and Usefulness cross loaded) .74 .19 239.42 26 208.04 <.001 
2 Factor (Creativity and Novelty cross loaded) .60 .32 359.61 26 328.23 <.001 
1 Factor Solution  .59 .24 409.08 27 377.70 <.001 
Note: All ideas were rated by 100 participants. All ∆ χ2 difference test were calculated against the 3 factor 
model. 
 I will once again apply the three step procedure suggested by Hofmann (1997) as 
conducted by Deadrick et al. (1997) focusing on the two social distance conditions. This 
analysis begins with a base model including only the dependent variable at Level 1 to 
partition the total variance explained at the idea and individual levels. Using the 
estimated variance components at the idea level (r = 5.74) and at the individual level (u0 
= .006, p > .500) of the base model, the variance in the dependent variable attributable to 
each level can be computed. Using the variance components from Model 1, the 
proportion of variance that can be explained at the individual Level 2 is 0.1% with the 
remaining 99.9% of variance attributed to ideas at Level 1. With less than .1% of residual 
variance existing at the individual Level 2 in this study, consideration of individual level 
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direct effects was not warranted. However, moderation may still be possible so the 
variance components are considered and reported in Table 18. These results do not 
support either Hypothesis 1 or 2. However, there is significant variance at the idea level 
and further consideration of how novelty and usefulness are weighted in these judgments 
of creativity might be worthy of consideration. These weightings are thus presented in 
Table 17.  
Table 17: Study 3 - Results Hierarchical Linear Modeling Results for Level 1 Main 
Effects with no Level 2 predictors 
Fixed Effects Coefficient 
Standard 
Error t-ratio p 
Intercept, β0j 4.67 .079 59.31 < .001 
Usefulness, β1j  .192 .040 4.81 < .001 
Novelty, β2j  .704 .029 24.22 < .001 
Note: N=348 for the fixed effects calculations using only low and high conditions. Additional variance 
explained was computed over the Null model to be R
2
 = .71. Variance components for the null model were: 
Level 1 residual = 5.920 and individual = .009.  
 
 These results show creativity judgments in this study being driven primarily by 
evaluations of novelty (β2 =.704, p < .001) but the usefulness coefficient (β1 =.192 p < 
.001) while smaller is significant. Using Level 1 residuals from models 1 and 2, the Level 
1 estimated variance explained by these two variables was 71.3%.  
Table 18: Study 3 – Variance Components for Level 1 Main Effects with no Level 2 
predictors 
Fixed Effects 
Variance 
Component SD 
df 
χ2 p 
Intercept, μ0 .188 .434 97 101.28 .363 
Usefulness slope, μ1  .041 .203 97 90.25 > .500 
Novelty slope, μ2  .019 .138 97 93.14 > .500 
Level 1,r 1.648 1.284    
Note: Chi-square statistics were based on only 98 units that had sufficient data for computation. Fixed 
effects and variance data are based on all of the data.  
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 The non-significant variance components indicate that there is not enough 
variance in these variables to make further analysis meaningful. These results fail to 
support a necessary pre-condition for evaluating moderation effects with multi-level 
modeling (Hofmann, 1997). Further analysis considering ideas as fixed effects indicated 
that the social framing condition did not moderate usefulness (B = -.017, p = n.s.) but 
while not significant at .05, the interaction of novelty and social distance condition 
trended in the expected direction (B = .096, p = .084) and registered a .3% increase in 
explained variance. 
Discussion 
 Intended to replicate the finding of Study 1 in the laboratory, this experiment fell 
short. In not finding support for spatial distance moderating the relationships of novelty 
and usefulness with creativity judgments this study does not provide the kind of support 
for the two hypotheses presented in this dissertation. However it does appear that even 
though this manipulation influenced the perceived social distance of the participants, the 
extent to which this occurred was rather limited. Participants in both conditions clustered 
toward the middle of the scale (Mclose = 3.04, Mdistant = 3.56) on the perceived social 
distance manipulation check indicating that this study may also suffer from range 
restriction considerations in having enough statistical power to identify moderation 
effects (McClelland & Judd, 1993). This possibility is strengthened by the lack of 
psychological distance measured in the broader task distance manipulation check. The 
HLM analysis did not indicate significant variance at the individual level based on the 
framing conditions. However, the supplemental analysis indicated a trend of social 
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distance strengthening the relationship of novelty and creativity, though not enough to 
reach statistical significant. Perhaps a stronger manipulation driving the conditions 
further apart may help reveal the anticipated moderation effect. 
 These results confirm a similar pattern as discussed with Study 2, in that for Idea 
3 usefulness was not significantly correlated with creativity. However in this study using 
the same task and ideas to be rated found a higher correlation of usefulness to creativity 
for Idea 1. While this variation does not help support the psychological distance 
moderator effect hypothesized, this variation in how usefulness and novelty relate to 
judgments of creativity within the same domain but across ideas suggests a more 
dynamically applied construct than an assumed stable combination of novelty and 
usefulness. 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
IX.  GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 The purpose of this program of studies was to begin to identify if and through 
what contextual framings could creativity be focused more or less towards considerations 
of novelty and/or usefulness. By demonstrating that the contextual framing of a task may 
influence how judgments of creativity are made, the question then becomes was this a 
statistical anomaly or might there be consistent effects associated with psychological 
distance moderating the salience of the dimensions of creativity in arriving at a judgment 
of an ideas creativity? This dissertation presented three studies looking to explore how 
considerations of contextual distance in three different forms may moderate the 
weightings of novelty and usefulness in making judgments of creativity. Support was 
found for moderation of both weightings of novelty and usefulness with respect to 
general psychological distance in Study 1 and marginal support was found through 
supplemental analysis in Study 3 for moderation of the relationship between novelty and 
creativity by social distance.  
 I believe that this dissertation makes several contributions to the literature on 
creativity. First, by providing evidence that the relationship between the dimensions of 
novelty and usefulness to creativity may not be stable even within the same domain or 
problem context, I begin to challenge some implied assumptions underlying historical 
conceptualizations and operationalizations of creativity. These assumptions ground 
creativity in a stable relationship with its primary components of novelty and usefulness. 
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While the criteria of what contributes to a judgment of creativity has long been expected 
to vary between domains (e.g., Amabile, 1996; Csikszentmihalyi, 1996), how 
considerations of novelty and usefulness are combined to render those judgments has 
been little researched (Litchfield, 2008; Unsworth, 2001; Zhou & Shalley, 2003). This 
challenging of the assumption of a stable relationship between novelty, usefulness, and 
creativity provides support for a more flexible consideration of creativity, where the 
construct of creativity is no longer defined by novelty and usefulness but rather predicted 
by considerations of these facets.  
 Building off of this conceptual adjustment, a second contribution to the creativity 
literature is a new measurement approach incorporating measures of novelty, usefulness, 
as well as overall creativity taken together to better describe what is meant when judges 
make evaluations of creativity in what I would like to call the triangulation approach. In 
putting forward a measurement model that operationalizes creativity in concert with its 
primary predictors, I provide a method for reporting a more precise description of what is 
being considered as creative in research using subjective measures of this construct as 
suggested originally by Amabile as an extension of her Consensual Assessment 
Technique, (1983). This type of approach can even be used to reexamine older data sets 
by having new judges consider the results of past generative experiments using this new 
triangulation approach to clarify the nature of creativity‘s relationship with a number of 
previously explored constructs. In reporting not just overall creativity but what is meant 
by that concept research will begin to build a better understanding of the ―elusive 
construct‖ (George, 2007) and build a broad foundation of how creativity may differ not 
only between domains but within domains, organizations, and work groups. This ability 
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to be clear about the nature of the construct of creativity being reported in the research 
literature should help this information readily translate to relevant practical applications 
with less confusion. 
 A third contribution is that this dissertation begins to explore what types of 
situational factors may encourage individuals to increase their focus on either novelty or 
usefulness. Work situations may at times call for radically new ideas and at other times 
require more utility focused solutions. This dissertation begins to explore how contextual 
framing may allow managers to encourage the desired types of creativity. By focusing on 
factors that are readily controllable by most managers, this work may help managers 
focus employees‘ creative energies towards the types of creative activities that are need 
by the organization in a particular instance. Further examination of how situational 
context may influence not only creativity evaluation but also generation may help in 
explaining why two organizations in the same industry (domain) develop and chose 
radically different innovations when dealing with similar issues.  
 A fourth contribution may be a broadening of how we consider context 
influencing creativity. It has been noted that most contextual effects on creativity 
generation have been postulated to work through activating intrinsic motivation (Shalley 
et al., 2004). However, there may be other cognitive and psychological mechanisms by 
which context can influence creativity. In this dissertation, I conceptually proposed that 
mental construal level may be one of those mechanisms. Even though I did not directly 
test this mechanism, the moderation effects in Study 1 while controlling for intrinsic 
motivation support this possibility. The effort to begin expanding the list of explanatory 
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mechanisms through which context may influence creativity may open up this line of 
inquiry for other researchers to explore additional mechanisms beyond intrinsic 
motivation. 
While I may enjoy highlighting the potential important contributions of this work, 
it would be unfair to do so without recognizing significant limitations to these claims. 
The first limitation is the fact that moderation effects were found in one of three studies 
using the intended HLM analysis, and it took a supplemental analysis to uncover a 
second instance that showed a trend towards moderation in another using fixed effects 
regression. The moderation effects found in the field manipulating psychological 
distance, and the marginal effect of social distance on the salience of novelty in judging 
creativity, both need to be replicated to strengthen the support for claims of instability in 
the combinations of novelty and usefulness within a field or domain.  
While there may have been flaws in manipulation strength with the two laboratory 
studies, the fact remains that the moderating effects found with the field sample were not 
supported in the laboratory using the different dimensions of psychological distance 
manipulations. This lack of findings may have been caused by weak manipulations, or 
range restriction in both manipulated variables and idea stimuli. Examination of a broader 
range of psychological distance may also be valuable in determining if these effects are 
more or less evident at more extreme framing conditions exploring a broader range of the 
moderator variables (McClelland & Judd, 1993). Additional research will be necessary to 
confirm these moderation effects and extend this line of research beyond psychological 
distance to claim justification for changes to broader considerations of creativity.  
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Another limitation is that all of these studies considered ideas generated with the 
intent to be creative in mind. This creates a propensity for range restriction in the extent 
the rated ideas span the full range of creativity, novelty, and usefulness from very low to 
very high levels. Although the full range of responses were captured across individuals, 
ideas in these studies tended to be rated on average within the middle third of each of 
these scales. Thus these results can only speak with confidence to moderate levels of 
usefulness, novelty, and creativity, potentially limiting the generalizability of these 
findings to a restricted range of consideration. While the majority of work situations may 
tend to deal with ideas settling into this moderate range for our focal variables (Amabile, 
1996; Beghetto & Kaufman, 2007), this is a potential limitation in holding these findings 
relevant to the extremes of creativity.  
An alternative explanation for the effects of psychological distance could be a 
consideration of risk and time pressure. As evaluations of creative ideas are in part based 
on estimates of novelty and usefulness of the resulting implementation of these ideas, 
these evaluations contain an inherent amount of uncertainty (Mumford et al., 2002). 
Uncertainty and risk have a long history with influencing decision making priorities (e.g., 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). As judgments from a greater 
psychological distance are made from a standpoint of increasing uncertainty these 
judgments may discount risks to a greater extent than those judgment made at a more 
proximal distance (Okhuysen & Bonner, 2005). Additionally, the costs of increasing time 
pressure may highlight risks of non-completion of a task and thus influence the 
prioritization of novelty or usefulness. Domain expertise, which should be directly related 
to concerns of uncertainty with respect to psychological distance, was controlled for in 
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these studies. With these controls and instructions in place, it is highly unlikely that the 
results for psychological distance were due to uncertainty or risk considerations but these 
are consideration that must be kept in mind as research with these constructs continues.  
In light of the limitations described above, there are many opportunities available 
to continue to explore how novelty and usefulness evaluations contribute to judgments of 
creativity. There is some evidence that this relationship may not be as stable as 
previously assumed but there are many opportunities to extend this work and broaden the 
generalizability of this type of research. The final section of this dissertation will begin to 
outline some additional avenues that may provide support for a more nuanced 
consideration of creativity for researchers and a richer understanding of how the concept 
of creativity is implicitly used in practice. 
 
  
  
 
 
X.  FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 The consideration that the relationship between novelty, usefulness, and creativity 
may not be fixed but rather a situationally dependent construction, opens up many doors 
for future research. With the problems identified in Studies 2 and 3, a logical future 
direction would be to attempt to replicate the moderation evidenced in Study 1 by 
addressing the issues with the flawed studies and attempt to rerun them with a new 
engaged sample. This effort would begin to provide corroboration for the contextually 
dependent nature of how novelty and usefulness are weighted in making creativity 
judgments.  
 It may also be valuable to explore the relationship of novelty and usefulness to 
creativity across the full range of those variables. While ideas generated with creative 
intent may be naturally range restricted in that internal evaluation of these ideas may limit 
responses that are at the extreme low end of any factor and ideas at the extreme high end 
are by nature very rare (Beghetto & Kaufman, 2007). The idea that creativity exists on a 
continuum that covers very low levels to very high levels does not preclude the fact that 
creativity at the extremes may be very rarely encountered. Creativity may be found to 
have a ―highly skewed distribution‖ (Amabile, 1996: 39) that favors low to average 
creativity. Thus studies with restricted ranges of novelty, usefulness, and creativity may 
very well generalize to a broad array of organizational circumstances. However 
researchers should be encouraged to explore the extremes of these constructs, perhaps 
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using specifically created stimuli in a policy capturing study to explore differences in the 
relationships between the levels of these focal variables across the full range of 
possibilities. 
 Examination of how other contextual factors may influence the weighting of 
novelty and usefulness in making judgments of creativity may be another potential 
avenue for future research. Research may consider how factors like risk propensity, 
physical setting, status, and power dynamics influence how we weight novelty and 
usefulness in making creativity judgments. Expanding our understanding of how 
contextual and situational factors may influence how people evaluate ideas and products 
as creative can help organizations streamline their innovation processes and direct new 
efforts in a concerted fashion. Additionally, these factors may have particular 
significance to entrepreneurs attempting to position their new products or concepts in the 
best, most creative light.  
 If novelty and usefulness are predictors of creativity judgments, are there 
potentially other factors that commonly are included in making a creativity assessment? 
Identifying if there are other factors common across domains or if in certain domains a 
third or fourth factor should be considered would be a valuable contribution to the 
creativity literature. Perhaps the work of Besemer and O‘Quin (1986, 1989) is a step in 
the right direction by attempting to capture multiple dimensions of creativity, but more 
work in this area from both the qualitative and quantitative side may help clarify the 
dimensionality of creativity. 
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 Having proposed a new measurement model for creativity and developed 
measures for assessing the creativity, novelty, and usefulness for ideas and products, a 
potential area for future research is in the area of scale development to enable researchers 
to measure the creativity of employees by capturing multiple measures of the three focal 
constructs. Reworking and extending the measures of employee and individual creativity 
would be a valuable tool in the broader consideration of creativity as a personal 
characteristic.  
 Finally, while this dissertation focuses on differences in creativity evaluation with 
a fixed domain, consideration of how novelty and usefulness may vary in their relation to 
creativity in the generative process and across different domains would broaden the 
appeal of this line of inquiry. Perhaps considerations of creativity are stable within the 
domain of art but not business? Perhaps novelty and usefulness relate to creativity 
generation in a fixed and stable fashion? These are empirical questions that would be 
valuable to explore. 
 In this dissertation, I have tried to expand our conceptualization of how novelty 
and usefulness relate to judgments of creativity. Along the way I have created a new 
measurement model and tested the viability of several fundamental assumptions 
underlying historical perspectives on creativity. By providing evidence that the 
weightings of novelty and usefulness may not always stable with relation to how 
creativity is judged, I have sought to propose adjustments both conceptually and 
operationally for how researchers can address this construct without relying on this 
assumption of stability. In doing so, I hope to help the field pin down the ―elusive 
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construct‖ and help practitioners make better use of our collective findings by giving 
them additional tools to focus their own organizations‘ creative efforts. 
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